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Abstract
he aim of this doctoral thesis is to bridge the gap between theoreti-
cal ideals of authenticity and practical authenticity-related problems in
healthcare. In this context, authenticitymeans being “genuine,” “real,”
“true to oneself,” or similar, and is assumed to be closely connected
to the autonomy of persons. he thesis includes an introduction and
four articles related to authenticity. he ûrst article collects various
theories intended to explain the distinction between authenticity and
inauthenticity in a taxonomy that enables oversight and analysis. It
is argued that (in-)authenticity is diõcult to observe in others. he
second article oòers a solution to this diõculty in one theory of au-
thenticity. It is proposed that under certain circumstances, it is morally
justiûed to judge that the desires underlying a person’s decisions are in-
authentic. he third article incorporates this proposition into an already
established theory of personal autonomy. It is argued that the result-
ing conceptualization of autonomy is fruitful for action-guidance in
authenticity-related problems in healthcare. he fourth article collects
nine cases of possible authenticity-related problems in healthcare. he
theory developed in the third article is applied to the problems, when
this is allowed by the case-description, to provide guidance with regard
to them. It is argued that there is not one universal authenticity-related
problem but many diòerent problems, and that there is thus likely not
one universal solution to such problems but various particular solutions.
Keywords: Authenticity, autonomy, decision-making, healthcare, pater-
nalism, informed consent, bioethics
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Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. he term
autonomy comes from the ancient Greek auto, which means “self,” and
nomos, which means “law.” Being autonomous means that one is self-
governing. In biomedical contexts various concepts are associated with
the concern of patients’ autonomy, perhaps most notably decision-making
capacity and voluntariness. hat is, a patient is less autonomous to the
extent that she lacks decision-making capacity and to the extent that she
is not acting or choosing voluntarily. Sometimes, authenticity is also
invoked; a patient is less autonomous to the extent that her actions or
choices are inauthentic, or so the idea goes (cf., e.g., Christman 2009). he
aim of this thesis is to make theoretical ideals of authenticity helpful in
practical biomedical contexts, to further protect the autonomy of patients.
here are various uses of the term “authentic” in ordinary English.
Lauren Bialystok identiûes three main variations; in the ûrst sense,
authentic is synonymous with “original,” as in “being continuous with
a historical entity” (2014, p. 275). A 50’s-style diner is authentic in
this sense if it actually opened in the 1950s, was typical of that era,
and has remained unchanged since then. In the second sense, it is
synonymous with “real,” as opposed to “fake.” A citation is authentic in
this sense if it reects what the cited person actually said and has not
been fabricated or distorted. In the third sense, authenticmeans “true
to oneself” or “genuine.” When a person is authentic in this sense, her
behavior “converges with who she actually is” (p. 278). It is this sense of
the term and how it relates to autonomy that is of interest here.
his thesis includes four articles about authenticity. he ûrst article,
entitled “he Impossibility of Reliably Determining the Authenticity of
Desires: Implications for Informed Consent,” collects theories that are
intended to explain or conceptualize authenticity (Ahlin 2018a). In it,
I argue that authenticity is diõcult to observe in others. I call it “the
Determining Authenticity article,” or variations thereof. he second
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article is entitled “What Justiûes Judgments of Inauthenticity?” (Ahlin
2018b). In it, I formulate a proposal of how judgments that someone
else’s desires are inauthenticmay be justiûed. I call it “the Inauthenticity
Judgments article,” or similar. In the third article, which is entitled “A
Non-Ideal Authenticity-Based Conceptualization of Personal Auton-
omy” (Ahlin Marceta 2018), I develop an account of personal autonomy
which includes the notion of authenticity. I apply it in an analysis of a
paradigm case of possible inauthenticity to test and demonstrate the
practical usefulness of the conceptualization. I call this article “the
Autonomy article.” Finally, the fourth article, entitled “Nine Cases of
Possible Inauthenticity in Biomedical Contexts andWhat hey Require
from Bioethicists,” collects various cases in biomedical contexts where
the notion of authenticity has been or could reasonably be expected
to be ofmoral signiûcance. he account developed in the Autonomy
article is applied to the cases where this is possible. In what follows, I
call the article “the Nine Cases article,” or variations on that theme.
he introduction is structured as follows. In the next section, I pro-
vide an overview of themost central concepts that are relevant for the
present purposes. hereafter, I give a detailed description of themain con-
tribution of this thesis, namely that it bridges the gap between theoretical
ideals of authenticity and authenticity-related problems that clinicians
face in practical biomedical contexts. he subsequent section includes
a methodological discussion of how I have approached this problem.
Among other things, reflective equilibrium as a theory ofmoral justifica-
tion is explained and themethodological choices of this thesis are spelled
out. In the section thereafter, I summarize the four articles. In that section,
I also discuss some views that I have had to revise since the publication
of the articles, defend some of the choices I havemade with regard to the
present purposes, elaborate on the theoretical and practical context of




For the present purposes, themost central concepts are personal auton-
omy, decision-making capacity, and voluntariness. his section, parts of
which have been published in Ahlin (2017), provides a brief overview
of the three concepts. he discussion also places the arguments in this
thesis into a conceptual context.
Personal autonomy
here is no consensus regarding how personal autonomy should be
understood. But, the “many faces of autonomy” may not be as numer-
able as some have suggested (Taylor 2009, Ch. 2). It is generally held
that autonomy, in the moral sense relevant to the present discussion,
is a property that can be enjoyed to diòerent degrees. As a matter of
degree, autonomy is not a binary concept; a person can bemore or less
autonomous, as well as not autonomous and fully autonomous. Further-
more, autonomy is a property with both positive and negative elements.
Positively, autonomous persons are, for instance, capable of qualitative
self-reection; they can assess their own desires and values and choose
whether to bemoved by them. Negatively, autonomous persons are not
subject to control by other agents, inuences, or conditions.
In contemporary theory, the distinction should bemade between
procedural and substantial accounts of personal autonomy. In the pro-
cedural tradition, autonomy only concerns the form that decisions and
actions take. heorists are here only interested in matters such as the
process by which an agent comes to make a decision, the independence
of her choosing relative to external inuences, and so on.
In the substantial tradition, autonomy also concerns the content of
decisions and actions. In addition to matters of a procedural nature,
some substantialists take an interest in whether an agent’s choices are
self-supporting. To exemplify, consider a person who is physically and
mentally abused by her partner. he victim reects upon whether to
leave her partner, but decides not to do so. When contemplating the
case, proceduralists take into consideration the process by which the
13
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victim makes her decision, putting weight on the independence of her
decision-making procedure. heymay conclude that the victimmade an
autonomous decision. Substantialists, on the other hand, are concerned
also with the fact that the victim chose not to leave her abusive partner.
heymay instead conclude that the victim’s choice is self-injurious rather
than self-supporting, and that it is therefore non-autonomous.
Proceduralists sometimes accuse substantialists for unjustified pater-
nalism, towhich the latter tend to reply thatproceduralists unwarrantedly
ignore the social embeddedness of personhood. I will not engage with
that debate here. Inwhat follows, Iwill only treat issues in the procedural
tradition, in line with the standard accounts in medical ethics.1
here are threemajor ways in which personal autonomy is relevant
for the present purposes, namely autonomous wishes, decisions, and
acts. he autonomy of wishes and decisions concerns the inner life
of agents while the autonomy of acts concerns their outer life. A per-
son can, for instance, hold autonomous wishes andmake autonomous
decisions, but for some reason be incapable of autonomously acting
upon those wishes and decisions. To illustrate, consider a fully healthy
patient who is strapped to her hospital bed due to a clinician’s mistaken
belief that she will hurt herself and others if le unconstrained. he
patient is unable to move freely, and is thus robbed of her capacity to
act autonomously. Yet, she can hold the autonomous wish to be freed,
andmake the autonomous decision to try to free herself by twisting and
turning violently to break out of the straps.
Likewise, a person can be capable of acting autonomously while
holding non-autonomous wishes andmaking non-autonomous deci-
sions. Consider a patient who is temporarily under the inuence of
drugs that do not aòect her physical abilities but signiûcantly distorts
her view of herself and her surroundings. Shemight, for instance, hold
a non-autonomous wish to hurt herself, non-autonomously decide to
do so, and autonomously act upon those wishes and decisions.
1For further inquiry into the debate between proceduralists and substantialists, see, e.g.,
Christman (2004, 2015) and Oshana (2015).
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In theirbookPrinciples of BiomedicalEthics (2013),TomL.Beauchamp
and James F.Childress hold respect for autonomy as one of four principles
that in combination encompasses biomedical ethics. he other principles
are nonmaleficence, i.e., the obligation to abstain from causing harm to
others, beneficence, i.e., the moral requirement to contribute to others’
welfare, and justice, i.e., equality in access to health care and in health
status. In the book, none of the four principles take precedence over the
others a priori (cf. pp. 13–25). However, according to some bioethicists,
respect for autonomy is “first among equals” (Gillon 2003, p. 310):
Firstly, autonomy—by which in summary I simplymean deliber-
ated self rule; the ability and tendency to think foroneself, tomake
decisions for that thinking, and then to enact those decisions—is
what makes morality—any sort ofmorality—possible.
In what follows, I do not commit to any particular position regarding
themoral weight of personal autonomy, beyond the general recognition
that it is morally valuable in biomedical contexts.
Amore detailed account of personal autonomy is introduced in the
Autonomy article below. To summarize the discussion in this subsec-
tion, autonomy is a property that persons can enjoy to diòerent degrees.
In this context, it matters to a patient’s autonomy whether she is capa-
ble ofmaking healthcare decisions. Lacking such competence entails
that she is non-autonomous in some aspects and to some extent. Fur-
thermore, it matters to a patient’s autonomy whether she makes her
healthcare decisions voluntarily; non-voluntary decision-making is non-
autonomous. hese concepts are explained in greater detail in the two
following subsections.
Decision-making capacity
In these contexts, competence is an element that refers to a patient’s
capacity to make healthcare-related decisions. A patient is competent,
or has decision-making capacity, if she can understand information
provided, appreciate in what way it concerns her, and reason about it in
light of her own values and preferences (cf. Charland 2015, sec 2). hese
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capabilities imply several others. For instance, they require of patients
that they are capable of thinking critically of themselves as intertemporal
subjects; a capability oen lacking in children (and others). Beauchamp
and Childress suggest seven types of related inabilities (2013, p. 118):
1. Inability to express or communicate a preference or choice
2. Inability to understand one’s situation and its consequences
3. Inability to understand relevant information
4. Inability to give a reason
5. Inability to give a rational reason (although some supporting
reasons may be given)
6. Inability to give risk/beneût-related reasons (although some
rational supporting reasons may be given)
7. Inability to reach a reasonable decision (as judged, for example,
by a reasonable person standard)
hesemark a threshold level of decision-making competence, so that
persons who display one or more inabilities from 1 through 7 should be
judged as not fully competent to make the decision in question.
Competence is not a global but a particular threshold element, in the
sense that being competent is to be competent relative to some speciûc
decision (Buchanan and Brock 1990, pp. 18–20). For example, a person
may be capable to make decisions about her healthcare but not about
her ûnances, or capable to make one healthcare decision in themorning
but incapable to make that same decision in the evening.
Furthermore, Beauchamp and Childress recognize that the level of
evidence for determining competence should vary according to the risk
of the decision; complex health care decisions should require a higher
degree of conûdence in the patient’s decision-making competence than
simple decisions. For instance, the required level of evidence of compe-
tence should be higher when the decision is to consent to participation
in medical research than the required level of evidence when the de-
cision is to object to participation (2013, p. 120). herefore, it must be
determined in each case against objective standards whether a patient
is competent relative to the particular decision in question.
16
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In an article which is cited below, namely Grisso et al. (1997), an
instrument is presented for assessing patients’ decision-making capac-
ities in clinical practices. he instrument is called “the MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment” (MacCat-T). Applied in
interviews with patients, theMacCat-T tests abilities related to under-
standing of relevant information, reasoning about the risks and beneûts
of potential options, appreciation of the nature of one’s situation and
the consequences of one’s choices, and to expressing a choice (p. 1415).
An interview requires 15 to 20 minutes. During this time, under-
standing is assessed by evaluating the patient’s ability to paraphrase
what has been disclosed concerning her disorder, the recommended
treatment, and related beneûts and risks (p. 1416). Reasoning is assessed
by examining how the patient explains her choices, i.e., whether she
mentions relevant consequences, alternatives, etc., and if her choices are
coherent with her explanation of them (ibid). Appreciation is assessed
by exploring if the patient acknowledges that the relevant information
applies to her; lacking appreciation is shown if the patient’s beliefs are
based on delusional or distorted perceptions (ibid).
Voluntariness
I call the theory of voluntariness which has been most influential in
bioethics the voluntariness-as-control theory. It is supported by, among
others, Appelbaum et al. (2009), Beauchamp and Childress (2013), and
Nelson et al. (2011). According to the voluntariness-as-control theory,
an action is voluntary if it is free from controlling influences.
Nelson et al. (2011) provide themost elaborate account of the theory
that voluntariness is closely linked to being in control over one’s actions.2
Voluntary action, they argue, should be understood in terms of the two
necessary and jointly suõcient conditions of intentional action and
2According to Nelson et al. (2011, p. 11), the theory of voluntariness as degree of control was
first introduced by Wall (2001). However,Wall did not conceive the notion of voluntariness
as control. Beauchamp and Childress had already written that the “primary meaning of
‘voluntariness’ is exercising choice free of coercion or other forms of controlling influence by
other persons” in the second edition of their Principles (1983, p. 87).
17
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absence of controlling inuences (p. 6). he notion of intention is binary,
in the sense that an act either is or is not intentional, while the notion of
controlling inuences is amatter of degree, so that an act can bemore or
less free from controlling inuences on a continuum from total control
to total absence of control.
Examples of controlling inuences in the broad sense include oòers
of payment, threats, education, deceit,manipulative advertising, emo-
tional appeals, and the like (p. 7). Such inuences can deprive agents of
at least some degree of voluntariness. Manipulation involves “the use
of nonpersuasivemeans to alter a person’s understanding of a situation
andmotivate the person to dowhat the agent of inuence intends” (p. 8).
A person can bemanipulated in several ways. One can manipulate the
information a person receives through diòerent communication tech-
niques or the format andmethod of risk disclosure. Financial incentives
such as oòers or rewards or access to drugs or medical care can distort
a person’s view of her options of choice.
Furthermore, one can bemanipulated through, for example, with-
held information,misleading exaggeration, and explicit lies, which are
all examples of cases in which themanipulated agent has no credible
possibility of recognizing that she is receiving skewed information. Sim-
ilarly, a person may be persuaded into doing or believing something.
However,Nelson et al. argue that persuasion is consistent with volun-
tariness. When persuaded, “a person believes something through the
merit of reasons proposed” and is therefore not controlled (p. 7).
Finally, a person can be controlled through coercion. Building from
a conceptual framework that was ûrst introduced by Nozick (1969),
Nelson et al. conceptualize coercion as the total control over an agent’s
actions that occurs “if and only if one person intentionally either
forces another person or uses a credible and severe threat of harm
to control another person” (p. 7). True coercion by threat “requires
that a credible and intended threat disrupts and reorders a person’s
self-directed course of action” (p. 8).
It has been suggested that voluntariness presupposes authenticity.
More speciûcally, the proposal is that voluntary choice requires choosing
18
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“in a way that is in conformity with one’s identity, aòective state, values,
and goals, and is truthful to one’s sense of self and view of the good life”
(Berghmans 2011, p. 24). I am sympathetic to themoral idea of analyzing
autonomous choice in terms of authenticity, but for reasons of analytical
clarity and precision I think that it is better to treat authenticity as an
independent concept rather than to include it in the theoretical base of
the conceptualization of voluntariness.
The aim of this thesis
To repeat, the aim of this thesis is tomake theoretical ideals of authentic-
ity helpful in practical biomedical contexts, with focus on a theoretical
ideal of authenticity known mainly from Harry G. Frankfurt (1971) and
Gerald Dworkin (1988) and on practical problems concerning medical
decision-making. his aim is facilitated by an overview of authenticity-
related problems (the Nine Cases article) and an explanation of why
theoretical ideals of authenticity are unhelpful in practice (the Deter-
mining Authenticity article). I argue that the aim is attained in two
respects; the thesis further develops an already established theory of
authenticity so that it yields practically observable implications (the
Inauthenticity Judgments article) and proposes an authenticity-based
conceptualization of personal autonomy against the backdrop of those
implications (the Autonomy article).
The current authenticity-related moral problem
heNine Cases article beginswith a quotation from a personwho reports
of her anorexia nervosa: “I wasn’t really bothered about dying, as long as
I died thin” (Tan et al. 2006, p. 274). Anorexia sometimes affects how
people who suffer from it value themselves, i.e.,mainly their weight and
body size, and in turn the values affect the anorectics’ motivational sets
with regard to nutrition and care. hus, there is sometimes a problematic
interaction in play between the disorder and the values that anorectics
have. In some cases, anorexia nervosa patients have decision-making
19
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capacity. Yet, they hold values that seem problematic in the above sense;
some report that they would rather die than gain weight.
Intuitively, there is something deeply distressing about holding such
values, and this distress has led some to analyze cases of anorexia nervosa
in terms of authenticity (Hope et al. 2011; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014; Tan
et al. 2006). One suggestion is that while some anorectics may have
decisional capacity, they are in a state of inauthenticity (ibid). hat is,
they are not themselves, in some substantive sense, and should therefore
nevertheless not be allowed to make their own healthcare decisions. Or,
that is the hypothesis which motivates the aim of this thesis.
Similar problems also appear in other medical situations. Untreated
syphilis may cause changes in a person’s character that make the person
or her decisions inauthentic. People suffering from borderline personality
disorder (BPD) may, in a short time span, express drastically conflicting
opinions on their medical treatment. It may be the case that their condi-
tions should be described and analyzed in terms of inauthenticity. And so
on. heNine Cases article collects nine examples in which the notion of
authenticity has been or may be relevant in practical biomedical contexts.
Philosophers that have set out to analyze authenticity in biomedical
contexts have proposed various conceptualizations of the notion. here
is substantial disagreement already at the outset of this debate. First,
it is not clear what it is that should be subject to critical scrutiny in
terms of authenticity. Some hold that an analysis of authenticitymust
begin with the concept of what it is to be a real person. Others hold that
the notion of personhood is secondary at best, as it is the authenticity
of medical decisions that is of interest in clinical practices. Secondly,
philosophers who agree on what should be the subject of the analysis
champion competing theories of what distinguishes authenticity from
inauthenticity. For instance, some theorists argue that it is the causal
history of a desire that matters most to its authenticity. Others, while
agreeing on the focus on desires, instead argue that it is the coherence




In this thesis, I have made two choices with regard to these debates,
neither of which will be defended at length. he ûrst choice is to focus
on the authenticity of desires, rather than of persons, lives, or something
else. his is because I, as many others in this ûeld, hold desires to be
themost basic element in ordinary preference forming and, thus, the
most basic element in decision-making (cf., e.g., Taylor 2005). For the
purposes of this thesis, I think of a desire as an attitude or directedness
which inuences the decisions that the desire-holder makes. Among
other things, this means that some of the problems that are introduced
in the Nine Cases article are not treated in this thesis, as they do not
concern decision-making.
he second choice I havemade is to focus on a theoretical tradition
of thinking about authenticity that first took form in a set of books and
articles in the 1970’s and 1980’s, of which Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin
(1988) are themost noteworthy. In this tradition, authentic desires are dis-
tinguished from inauthentic desires in that the formerwould be endorsed,
at least hypothetically, by the desire-holder upon informed and critical
self-reflection. Here, I call this criterion “affirmative self-reflection.”
I have had two reasons for making this choice. First, the Frankfurt–
Dworkean tradition of thinking about authenticity in terms of second-
order volition,meaning that the distinguishing feature between authen-
ticity and inauthenticity lies in the agent’s self-perception of the desire in
question, has been more inuential than any other theoretical tradition
with its roots in the last four or ûve decades of bioethical inquiry. If there
is onemainstream theory of authenticity, this is it. It is well-known to
my intended audience and any contribution to it should be of interest to
autonomy theorists in general, and to authenticity theorists in particular.
hus, it is a reasonable choice to attempt to contribute to this theoretical
tradition rather than to some other,more peripheral, tradition.
Secondly, I think that theories in this tradition do a better job in
distinguishing between authenticity and inauthenticity than other types
of theories. It is an intuitive understanding that “authenticity” is a property
of a person’s desires that makes them different from desires that she does
21
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not want to have. hemost basic reason to consider the “authenticity”
of desires is that we want to distinguish between such different kinds of
desires. he Frankfurt–Dworkean tradition of thinking about authenticity
manages tomake this intuitive understanding of authenticity theoretically
plausible. It provides an explanation of authenticity that, in light of the
arguments from its advocates, seems very reasonable.
The problem of practical application
here are various problems with this theory. For instance, it can be
argued that aõrmative self-reection itself requires aõrmative self-
reection, and that the theory therefore results in an inûnite regress.3 I
do not address such problems in this thesis, i.e., problems concerning
whether the theory succeeds in distinguishing between authenticity and
inauthenticity. At present, I do not have a more elaborate defense of
this tradition than what other theorists have already put forth (see, e.g.,
Christman 2009 and Juth 2005). However, it is not included in the aim
of this thesis to defend this kind of theory as such. In what follows,my
arguments should be understood as building on the assumption that
some version of the theory is true, or at least plausible.
My focus is instead on problems associated with applying the theory
in practical contexts. One major problem is that the theory fails to
yield practically observable consequences. I elaborate on this in the
DeterminingAuthenticity article. In short, it is diõcult to knowwhether
a desire-holder would endorse her own desires upon informed and
critical self-reection. herefore, aõrmative self-reection appears to
be an ideal that is unhelpful in terms of action-guidance in practical
biomedical contexts.
In the Inauthenticity Judgments article, I develop a version of the
Frankfurt–Dworkean theory that includes practically observable indica-
tors of inauthenticity. his is a ûrst attempt to bridge the gap between
theoretical ideals of authenticity and practical authenticity-related prob-
3See Taylor (2005) for an elaborate version of this argument. See also Juth (2005, pp. 153–62)
for a version of the theory in which the problem of an infinite regress may never arise.
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lems. he version of the theory is not morally neutral. It is formulated in
terms ofmoral justiûcation,meaning that the problem of determining
whether a desire is inauthentic is phrased in terms of when it is morally
justiûed tomake the judgment that it is inauthentic. Among other things,
this means that theremay be inauthentic desires that observers are not
justiûed to judge as inauthentic.
It is important to note that paternalist interventions such as, for in-
stance, force-feeding an anorectic who states that she would rather die
than gain weight, are not justifiedmerely because it is (by hypothesis)
justified to judge that her desires are inauthentic. Paternalist interventions
require further justifications, not least considering the proportionality of
the intervention and the degree of epistemic certainty of inauthenticity.
his thesisdoesnot include any elaborate discussion ofpaternalism, or any
detailed suggestions of how the present theories could support paternalist
interventions. With that being said, the background of the discussion is
the practical bioethical problem of compulsory care, and whether there
is any ground for using considerations of inauthenticity as part of the
justificatory base for overriding someone’s healthcare decisions.
In the Autonomy article, I incorporate my re-stated and morally
loaded version of the Frankfurt–Dworkean theory in Beauchamp and
Childress’s theory of personal autonomy. hereby, this thesis constructs
a conceptualization of autonomy that manages to take authenticity into
account. he principle of respect for autonomy is widened to include
judgments of authenticity, which is one way in which this thesis makes
theoretical ideals of authenticity helpful in practical biomedical contexts.
In my view, this thesis contributes to solving a paradigm problem which
has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time. Although it is
of course up to the critical reader to judge, I believe that the aim of the
thesis has thus been met.
Methodological issues
In this section, I discuss a number ofmethodological issues connected to
the present purposes. First, I explainmy initial approach to the problems
treated in this thesis. hen, I introduce reective equilibrium as a theory
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of justiûcation and as a process ofmoral inquiry. hereaer, I discuss
the kind of normative guidance that theorists in this context can pro-
vide practitioners with. A ûnal subsection includes some summarizing
concluding remarks.
Initial approach to the problem
he ûrst methodological choice in applied ethics is how to approach
the problem one wishes to solve. here are various such possibilities.
Sometimes, theorists begin by distinguishing between top-down and
bottom-up approaches. In other cases, they begin by distinguishing
between ideal and non-ideal theory.
In a top-down approach, a theory is chosen and applied to the
problem at hand. his is how, for instance, Peter Singer approaches
problems in practical ethics (Singer 1993). In his book, Singer takes a
“broadly utilitarian position” on various moral topics, such as animal
rights, abortion, and the environment (p. 12). hereby, he attempts to
solve practical problems by applying utilitarianism to them and report of
the results. One problemwith the top-down approach is that it demands
a lot from the theory that is applied. Singer’s proposed solutions are
dependent on the truth of utilitarianism, which is far from evident.
In a bottom-up approach, the goal is to identify the (potential)
problem independently from normative theories ûrst, and then apply
diòerent theories to see what comes out of the analysis. his is, for
instance, how JonathanWolò approaches moral topics in public policy
such as gambling, drugs, and safety (Wolò 2011). In his book,Wolò seeks
to describe the cases neutrally, before engaging in moral analysis from
the perspective of diòerent normative theories (ibid, “Introduction”).
One problem with the bottom-up approach is that moral problems
cannot be observed with no prior idea of what is morally relevant. he
mere fact that something is described as amoral problem appears to
signal that some tacit normative assumptions have been made.
Sometimes,more oen in political philosophy than in applied ethics,
theorists instead begin by distinguishing between ideal and non-ideal
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theory. here are diòerent uses of the terms (see, e.g., Hamlin and
Stemplowska 2012; Valentini 2012), but I understand them as follows.
In ideal theory, theorists construct a desirable hypothetical model
of the object under scrutiny. hereaer, the actual circumstances are
compared to themodel, and action-guidance is provided through obser-
vation of the diòerences. his is, for instance, how John Rawls (2001)
takes on the problem of justice. In his writings, Rawls constructs a hypo-
thetical model of society in which its basic institutions are perfectly just.
Real societies can be compared to the Rawlsian ideal and policies may
be formulated which would lead society in the direction of the ideal, or
perhaps even fulûll it.
It can be argued that one problem with ideal theory is that although
hypothetical models may be very neat, real people and real institutions
rarely behave as expected. Ideals do not take the complexity and imper-
fections of the realworld into suõcient account and therefore sometimes,
or in some respects, fail to provide substantial guidance for vacillating
agents (see, e.g., Sen 2006; Wiens 2015).
Non-ideal theory, as I will understand it here, is more similar to
the bottom-up approach. It is problem-oriented, in the sense that a
problem is identiûed, the possibilities and limitations of the case are
explicated, and proposals are formulated as towhat might make the case
less of a problem. his is, for instance, how David Schmidtz takes on
the problem of justice (2006). In his book, Schmidtz proposes that the
notion of justice has four elements which are expressed by principles
of desert, reciprocity, equality, and need. For any given justice-related
problem, principles from the four elements should be weighed against
each other to articulate and solve the particular problem at hand.
Defenders of ideal theory have argued, among other things, that
idealization is nonetheless a necessary component in moral thinking.
For instance, O’Neill writes that “if ethical principles are to be relevant
to a wide range of situations or of agents, they surely not merelymay
but must be abstract” (1987, p. 55). Much of the criticism of ideal theory,
it has been argued, is “too sweeping” (Erman andMöller 2013, p. 43).
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In this thesis, I have attempted amoderately problem-oriented ap-
proach, in the sense that I have taken on what appears to be moral
problems (and have been treated as moral problems by other ethicists).
I have not approached them top-down or constructed ideal models in
my attempts to provide normative guidance with regard to them. Yet, I
do not claim to approach the problems from a fully neutral point of view.
Most importantly, I think of my view as guided by the individualist,
autonomy-based, non-paternalist contemporary bioethical paradigm
(Ahlin 2017; Faden and Beauchamp 1986; Jonsen 2000). Furthermore,
I am methodologically guided by a theory of what justiûes normative
propositions, namely reective equilibrium. Among other things, this
means that I take on issues that are intuitively problematic, aiming to
provide a balanced normative judgment with regard to them. hus,my
initial approach to the problems in this thesis is non-ideal,mainstream,
andmethodologically theory-dependent.
Normative justification
I adhere to a theory ofwhat justiûes normative propositions, and of how
moral inquiry should be conducted, that is commonly known as reec-
tive equilibrium. It is a coherentist theory that bases justiûcation on the
coherence of a full set of beliefs, to be contrasted with, e.g., foundation-
alist theories inwhich justiûcation rests on a non-inferential foundation
(Daniels 2016; Hasan and Fumerton 2016). In this subsection, I elabo-
rate on my view of reective equilibrium as a theory of justiûcation and
as a process of deliberation, beginning with the former.
For the present purposes, I distinguish between claims of knowledge,
truth, and fact on the one hand, and claims of justiûcation on the other.
As a theory of justiûcation, reective equilibrium is a theory about
reason-giving (cf. deMaagt 2017, pp. 445–6). In short, I take it to be the
theory that a normative claim is reason-giving to the extent that it is
coherent with all other beliefs (in moral and non-moral matters) and
with our stable and consideredmoral intuitions. For instance, the claim,
“ceteris paribus, patients who suòer should be helped” is justiûed not
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because it is true, but because it is coherent with all other beliefs and
with our moral intuitions.
Among other things, moral reasons vary in strength and in rele-
vance. he strength of amoral reason is relative to other elements in the
equilibrium, not relative to some independent scale ofmeasurement.
For instance, relieving suòering is sometimes a reason to intervene with
a patient’s healthcare decisions, but respecting the patient’s autonomy
is oen a stronger reason not to intervene. Promoting justice between
patients is also amoral reason, although it is not relevant for the present
discussion. A judgment on whether to intervene with the patient’s
healthcare decisions is justiûed to the extent that it is balanced, taking
all relevant moral reasons, beliefs, and intuitions in consideration.
So far, reective equilibrium has been treated as a hypothetical end-
state of a deliberative process in which normative claims are justiûed.
But, it is common for the term to designate the deliberative process
itself, i.e., amethod ofmoral inquiry.
As a method, reflective equilibrium is the deliberative process of
reflecting on and revising moral judgments (and judgments related to
them). In that process, empirical facts, risks and uncertainties, critical self-
reflections of possible biases and other cognitivemisbehaviors, and so on,
must be taken into account. he process is goal-driven. It aims to identify
what is (and what is not) reason-giving in a particular case and provide a
balanced and considered judgment with regard to it. Furthermore,my
view is that the process should be thought of as continuous, in the sense
that theorists should treat moral justification as an ongoing process of
evaluation and re-evaluation where progress is made successively.
here are various criticisms of reflective equilibrium.4 Perhaps
most commonly, it is argued that for any subject there may be two
(or more) internally coherent sets of reflective equilibria,meaning that
themethod cannot provide conclusive normative guidance. Another
common criticism is that there is no guarantee that any particular
reflective equilibrium is not in factmerely a coherent set of ungrounded
4See, e.g., Daniels (2016) for a general overview and, e.g., Strong (2010) andWilligenburg
(2007) for criticism that is specific for reflective equilibrium in biomedical contexts.
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prejudices. Although these criticisms should be taken seriously by
bioethicists, I will not elaborate on them here nor provide a detailed
defense of reflective equilibrium.
Theorists and practitioners
he aim of applied ethics is sometimes to suggest practical policies, such
as how to distribute scarce healthcare resources or what an informed
consent form should contain. At present, however, my aim is rather
to contribute to a framework for decision-making. he framework
is constructed so that it spells out some normative content, such as
which moral principles should be respected, but leaves some blank
spaces which must be ûlled in by practitioners, such as what respecting
one of themoral principles entails in a particular case. herefore, the
framework includes “instructions” for “users.”
As explained above, respect for autonomy is a central moral principle
in bioethics. Among other things, the principle obliges healthcare prac-
titioners to refrain from intervening with patients’ decisions concerning
their own healthcare (possible exceptions include when patients lack
decision-making capabilities or are subject to controlling inuences).
heorists can spell out in greater detail what respect for autonomy en-
tails generally, but it is diõcult to formulate precisely how the principle
applies in particular cases. For illustration, consider this example,which
builds from Lee (2010, p. 525).5
A 17-year-old has lost a lot of blood in an accident. he best
chance of saving the teenager’s life is an urged blood transfusion
and a surgical intervention to stop the bleeding. However, the
teenager’s parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses. For religious reasons,
they refuse to give permission for the blood transfusion. hey
request that surgery should be carried out anyway, although
they understand that this will be much more dangerous than
operating with blood transfusion.
5In Lee’s original example, the case concerns a 2-year-old child.
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In this case, there is a conict between the principles of beneûcence,
i.e., to do good, and respect for (surrogate) autonomy. One considered
judgment is that the principle of respect for (surrogate) autonomy should
be overridden for beneûcence-related reasons and that the doctor should
proceed with transfusion of blood to the teenager.
his judgment is not anticipated by bioethical theory but is the
result partly of theory and partly of practical judgment in the particular
case. hat is, nowhere it is written or in any other way stated what
should be done in cases which involve 17-year-olds who have lost a lot
of blood in accidents and the best chance of saving the teenagers’ lives
is through urgent blood transfusions and surgical interventions to stop
the bleeding, and parents who are Jehovah’s Witnesses and refuse to
give permission, and so on. here are no indexes that include every
conceivable bioethical dilemma that practitioners can consult in search
of moral guidance. One way to phrase this indeterminacy is that the
moral principles involved are underdetermined (O’Neill 1987).
Bioethicists in the current school of thought inform practitioners
about how they shouldmakemoral decisions in caseswhere there is little
or no pre-existing guidance. his has two implications of relevance to
the present purposes. First, some normative content is determined in
practical settings rather than in theory. Healthcare practitioners, who
are in direct contact with moral dilemmas,must be expected to be well-
equipped and trainedmoral decision-makers. Second, there aremethods
for applying underdetermined bioethical principles. I will briefly treat
two such methods below, namely specificationism and casuistry.6
Methods for moral decision-making
When applying abstract and underdeterminedmoral principles and con-
cepts, practitioners determine some of their normative content. hat can
be done better or worse; better if it is donemethodically, and worse if not.
Specificationism and casuistry are two methods for this kind ofmoral
6It should be noted that it has been argued that there are no real diòerences between
speciûcationism and casuistry. See, e.g., Cudney (2014) for an illuminating discussion.
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decision-making. On my understanding, both aim at providing reliable
moral justification within a framework of reflective equilibrium, but in
differentways. With the exception of one section in the Autonomy article,
the present thesis does not include practical applications of abstract and
underdeterminedmoral principles and concepts. herefore, the discus-
sion in this subsection should be understood as being forward-looking;
it briefly introduces themethodological basis of how the normative sub-
stance in this thesis should be applied in practical settings.
Following Rauprich (2011), the first step in both specificationism and
casuistry is to decide tentatively which moral principles that apply in the
case at hand. For instance, in the case cited above with the 17-year-old
whose parents refused a blood transfusion, little deliberation is required
to determine tentatively that there is a conflict between beneficence
and respect for (surrogate) autonomy. he differences between the two
methods begin to appear in the second step of the process, which aims to
determine how the relevant moral principles apply in the particular case.
In speciûcationism, the second step is interpretative. One interpre-
tation of the principle of beneûcence is that “it is morally prohibited to
risk the death of a patient if his or her life-threatening condition can
be medically managed by suitable medical techniques,” and an inter-
pretation of the principle of respect for (surrogate) autonomy is that
“it is morally prohibited to disrespect a parental refusal of treatment”
(Lee 2010, p. 525). A balanced judgment may be that “it is morally pro-
hibited to disrespect a parental refusal of treatment unless the refusal
constitutes child abuse or child neglect or violates a right of the child,”
and that the parents’ refusal does in fact constitute abuse, neglect, or a
rights-violation (ibid, pp. 525–6). Interpretation requires insight into
the content and purpose of themoral principles, and an understanding
of the relevant empirical facts associated with the case at hand. It also
requires an explanation of why the chosen interpretation is correct.
In casuistry, the second step is comparative; guidance is sought in
comparisons with similar cases. For instance, in one similar (hypothet-
ical) case a decisionally-incapable adult is oòered vaccination against
Hepatitis A, which the surrogate decision-maker refuses with reference
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to the irrational and uninformed belief that vaccines cause autism. Given
that the cases are suõciently similar, the comparison provides guidance
in the case at hand. Suppose that the practitioners in the hypothetical
case decided to override the surrogate decision-maker’s wish. hen,
the practitioners in the case with the 17-year-old have reason to decide
to proceed with the blood transfusion. Among other things, casuistry
requires evidence of the similarity of the cases being compared. he
cases that are used for comparison should preferably be paradigm cases,
i.e., cases in which it is reasonably clear what should be done (Strong
2000, p. 331). But, theymay also be hypothetical. hen, they are thought
examples of the kind that is common to the ordinary philosophical
method of principled argumentation.
Both specificationism and casuistry can be further elaborated (see,
e.g., Beauchamp andRauprich 2016 and Strong 2000). However, Iwill not
providemore detailed accounts of the two methods. he brief introduc-
tion above suffices for the present purposes, i.e., to give a general idea of
how the arguments in this thesis can contribute to all-things-considered
judgments about how to act in particular situations in healthcare.
Concluding remarks on methodological issues
In conclusion, this thesis aims to make theoretical ideals of authenticity
helpful in practical biomedical contexts. I approach this problem from
a non-ideal yet theory-dependent point of view. Most importantly, I
adhere to reective equilibrium as a theory of justiûcation and as a
method of moral inquiry. I recognize that in this context, normative
principles and concepts are underdetermined, i.e., that some normative
content is determined in practical settings rather than in theory. here-
fore, practitioners should be equipped with and trained in themethods
of reliablemoral decision-making. I have here brieymentioned two
such methods, namely speciûcationism and casuistry. It is beyond the
purposes of this thesis and themethodological issues that accompany
its aims to elaborate further on thesematters here.
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Summary and discussion of the articles
Article 1: The Determining Authenticity article
In this article, I develop a taxonomy of characteristics displayed by vari-
ous theories of authenticity that enables overview and analysis. here-
aer, I use the taxonomy to argue that no category or class of charac-
teristics yields practically observable consequences. I conclude that in
practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined, and
that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent
practices in healthcare. Since the publication of this paper, I have had
to revise some of the views expressed in it. For instance, as the aim of
this thesis suggests, I am no longer of the view that authenticity has no
role to play in informed consent practices. herefore, in addition to
summarizing this article, I will here also explain in detail my current
views on the central topics discussed in it.
he article takes as its starting point the concept of informed con-
sent, which denotes a patient’s valid consent to or refusal of amedical
intervention. In simple terms, informed consent is short for informed,
voluntary, and competent consent (Eyal 2012). he general understanding
in bioethics is that informed consent aims to protect and promote pa-
tients’ autonomy, although alternative interpretations have been suggested
(see, e.g., O’Neill 2003). he problem treated in the article is whether
authenticity should be among the conditions of informed consent.
To give the problem a practical context, I introduce the hypothetical
case of Anna, a professional ballet dancer who needs medical treatment.
Anna is informed about her situation, is competent to make healthcare
decisions, and does so voluntarily. Yet, shemakes the surprising decision
to refuse toundergo a treatment thatwould allowher to continue dancing.
Her doctor considers whether Anna’s decision is authentic, and whether
her “true wishes” could be adhered to by forcing her to undergo the
medical procedure; perhaps Anna’s refusal is invalid.
hen, I introduce what I call “the argument from testability.” he
argument from testability is that worries such as the one that Anna’s
doctor has not only require a theory of authenticity but also the ap-
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propriatemeans to test the authenticity of patients’ decision-making,
which is diõcult. It ûrst appeared in Sjöstrand and Juth (2014) and is
foundational to this thesis; essentially, the aim of making theoretical
ideals of authenticity useful in practical contexts includes making it
practically feasible to test the authenticity of decision-making.
One of themerits of the Determining Authenticity article is that it
stresses the significance of the argument from testability by elaborating
on it and applying it to various traditions of authenticity theory. How-
ever, in the concluding remarks of the article I claim to have shown
that the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of desires cannot be reliably
detected. hat is an overstatement. I no longer believe that there is
support in the article for the claim.
In the article, instead of going through various theories of authen-
ticity and analyze them individually, I attempted to support the claim
that authenticity cannot be reliably detected by generalizing features
that various authenticity theories share and examine them categorically.
his led to a taxonomy of features that various authenticity theories
share. Although the purpose of developing the taxonomy was method-
ological, i.e., it was introduced for evaluative purposes, the taxonomy
itself is another merit of the article. It provides a systemic overview of
authenticity theories that enables analysis. In combination with a simi-
lar taxonomy by Robert Noggle (2005), I use the taxonomy again—for
other purposes—in the Inauthenticity Judgments article.
According to the taxonomy, the features that authenticity theories
share can be organized into three categories, namely sanctionist, originist,
and coherentist. In sanctionist theories, i.e., theories that display features
from the sanctionist category, desires are authentic if they are endorsed
by the desire-holder upon self-reection. he Frankfurt–Dworkean
tradition of thinking about authenticity belongs to this category, and in
what follows I will only use the categorical term “sanctionism” to denote
it. In originist theories, desires are authentic if they have the right kind of
origin. In coherentist theories, desires are authentic if they are coherent
with the desire-holder’s full set of desires. Furthermore, the features
are organized into two classes, namely cognitivist and non-cognitivist.
33
authenticity in bioethics
In cognitivist theories, authenticity is amatter of rational deliberation.
Non-cognitivist theories do not commit to this view.
In the article, I claim that the taxonomy is exhaustive,with the excep-
tion that it does not include theories of authenticity from the substantial
tradition of autonomy theory. However, it should be noted that the
taxonomy does not cover theories of authenticity in an existentialist
tradition either, i.e., theories that may be found in, e.g., Heidegger or
Sartre. his thesis is only concerned with theories of authenticity from
the procedural tradition, in which authenticity is analyzed according
to the content-neutral processes by which desires are formed or are
sustained. To be clear, I am now of the view that the taxonomy only
covers theories from this tradition.
Aer having introduced and explained the taxonomy, I discusswhat
the argument from testability requires from each category. his is where
the signiûcance of the argument from testability is highlighted, although
the arguments in the article do not support the claim that no theory
passes the test. I return to this discussion in both the Inauthenticity
Judgments article and the Autonomy article. In those articles, I build on
theweaker view thatwhile itmay not be impossible to reliably determine
the authenticity of desires, it is nonetheless diõcult to do so.
In the concluding remarks, I claim that authenticity should not be
included as a criterion in informed consent. Although I am currently
ambivalent about whether authenticity should be among the conditions
for valid consent or refusal to medical interventions, I am certain that
the arguments in the article do not suõce to ground the claim. In the
Autonomy article, I argue that autonomous actions and choices may
be analyzed in terms of authenticity. Among other things, this may
enable the inclusion of authenticity in informed consent practices, but
the possibility is not discussed further in this thesis.
Article 2: The Inauthenticity Judgments article
In this article, I argue that under certain conditions it is justiûed to
judge that a desire is inauthentic. My argument is threefold. First, I
propose a sanctionist thesis of the conditions under which judgments
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of inauthenticity are justiûed. hen, I introduce two empirical factors
that, when combined, indicate that the conditions in the thesis aremet.
Finally, I delimit the scope of my arguments to target only a certain
kind of people and a certain kind of desires. Since the publication of the
article, I have had to revisemy views about the ûnal delimiting clause.
As in the previous subsection, I will here not only summarize the article
but also introducemy current views with regard to the arguments in it.
he sanctionist thesiswhich I propose in the article is that judgments
of inauthenticity are justiûed if there is suõcient reason to believe that
the desire-holder would disapprove of having the desire upon informed
and critical self-reection. I call it “the dissenting self-reection thesis”
to connect it to, but also distinguish it from, the sanctionist ideal of
aõrmative self-reection. his reversed version of the sanctionist ideal
is a re-statement of the central thesis in sanctionism as amoral thesis;
the dissenting self-reection thesis does not distinguish between authen-
ticity and inauthenticity, but between when it is justiûed to judge that a
desire is inauthentic and when it is not justiûed to do so. Among other
things, the dissenting self-reection thesis entails that there may be
inauthentic desires which,mainly for reasons of epistemic uncertainty,
it is not justiûed to judge as inauthentic.
Aer having introduced the dissenting self-reection thesis, I sug-
gest two empirical factors which in combination would indicate that a
desire-holder would disapprove of having a desire, i.e., that it may be
justiûed to judge that the desire is inauthentic. he ûrst indicator of
inauthenticity is if it is known that the desire is due to causal factors that
are not normal to how the desire-holder is otherwise construed, taking
both physical andmental dispositions into consideration. he second
indicator is if it is known that the desire does not cohere with how the
desire-holder’s identity has developed over time and is presently being
sustained. In the article, the two indicators are scrutinized. It is shown
why both must be present for judgments of inauthenticity to be justiûed.
However, the dialectic in the article only leads to intuitively sound
conclusions regarding desires that are bad, in some sense. When a desire
is good, in some sense, it does not seem to be justiûed to judge that it is
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inauthentic in spite of the fact that both indicators of inauthenticity are
present. herefore, I introduce a clausewhich delimits the kind of people
and desires which are justiûably targeted by judgments of inauthenticity
in the present framework. he delimiting clause is that judgments
of inauthenticity here only target desire-holders who are known to
carry a general wish to live according to the prevailing social andmoral
standards, and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those
standards. he full theory can then be summarized as:
For persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social
andmoral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable
according to those standards, it is justiûed to judge that a desire
is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that
are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the
person’s practical identity.
However, since the publication of the article, I have had to revisemy views
about the delimiting clause. Itmayunnecessarily introduce someproblems
that should be avoided; there is no need to bring the prevailing social and
moral standards into the theory. In footnote 4 in the article, I write:
One plausible line of thought is instead that judgments of inau-
thenticitymay be justiûed in either case, but that they are only
interesting when the desire under scrutiny is bad in some sense.
I now think that this view is better, mainly for reasons of simplicity.
Instead of delimiting the scope of desires and desire-holders according
to the prevailing social and moral standards, I think that the scope
should be delimited to concern only desires which are held by people
who may hurt themselves or others. In practice, there may not be a
real diòerence between the two suggestions. he meaning of “hurt,”
for instance, depends on the prevailing social and moral standards.
But, a clause which delimits judgments of inauthenticity to concern
only desires held by desire-holders who may hurt themselves or others
is more in line with medical practices of compulsory care, which is
ultimately the context to which my thesis aims to contribute. herefore,
in the Autonomy article, I build on the revised delimiting clause instead.
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Article 3: The Autonomy article
In this article, I add the theory delineated in the Inauthenticity Judgments
article to Beauchamp and Childress’s theory of autonomy. he result is a
non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. I
apply it to a paradigm case of possible inauthenticity to test the theory
and show that it can provide action-guidance in practical contexts.
Beauchamp and Childress have developed a non-ideal theory of
autonomy building on the premise that everyday choices of generally
competent persons are autonomous. In the theory, autonomous actions
are analyzed “in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally,
(2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling inuences that
determine their action” (2013, p. 104). In the Autonomy article, I add a
fourth condition of authenticity to Beauchamp and Childress’s theory,
building on the arguments in the Inauthenticity Judgments article.
Aer having expanded Beauchamp and Childress’s conceptualiza-
tion of personal autonomy to include judgments of inauthenticity, I
apply the resulting theory to a case of anorexia nervosa. his further
develops the theory by demonstrating how it is intended to be applied
in practical contexts.
One problem for the application of the theory is that there are no
in-depth individual case-descriptions focusing on anorexia nervosa
in the literature on authenticity. herefore, in the article, I construct
a hypothetical case from two interview studies which are commonly
considered to be authoritative in this context, namely Hope et al. (2011)
and Tan et al. (2006). I take citations from real patients and let a
hypothetical person, “Amy,” represent them. In the article, Amy tells
her medical story, which is complex, vague, and contains little detailed
information. To the best ofmy knowledge, it is a realistic description of
a person who has been diagnosed with anorexia nervosa.
he analysis of Amy shows that my proposed theory yields reliable
results in real cases. Furthermore, it places the notion of authenticity
in a conceptual context that is familiar to theorists and practitioners,
showing that practical bioethics can encompass ideals of authenticity.
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Article 4: The Nine Cases article
In this article, I have collected nine examples of authenticity-related prob-
lems in biomedical contexts. Itsmain merit is that it provides an overview
of such problems, and that it points out the limitations of the theory devel-
oped in the Autonomy article. Against this background, I argue that there
is no universal theory of authenticity which can be applied to solve all
authenticity-related problems; the problems require different approaches.
Furthermore, I suggest more briefly that authenticity theorists should
consider a non-ideal methodological grip on the problems.
he cases collected in the article are both real and hypothetical. Most
of them are taken from the bioethical literature on authenticity, but some
are taken from conversations with psychiatrists and philosophers. he
cases are (1) inauthenticity from physical causes, (2) inauthenticity from
psychological causes, (3) unstable desire-sets, (4) lack of desires, (5) med-
ically induced authenticity, (6) inauthentic recovery, (7) indoctrinated
desires, (8) false selves, and (9) unexplained surprising desires. Cases 1
through 5 build on actual cases while cases 6 through 9 are hypothetical.
Case 1 describes a 40-year oldman who developed pedophilic symp-
toms that were later found to be causally linked to a brain tumor (Burns
and Swerdlow 2003). I use this as a paradigm case of inauthenticity in
the Inauthenticity Judgments article. Case 2 treats anorexia nervosa,
which has been described already in the above. Case 3 concerns pa-
tients suòering from BPD. As mentioned briey above, BPD patients
can sometimes display sudden and dramatic volitional shis that have
been analyzed in terms of authenticity before (Lester 2009). In case 4, I
describe persons suòering from late stages of schizophrenia, which may
include “negative” symptoms such as passivity and blunting of aòect
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). Some schizophrenics can be
described as living without any desires, and this condition could poten-
tially be analyzed in terms of inauthenticity. Case 5 reproduces a case
description from Kramer (1993). he case is a woman who had suòered
from severe depression before being successfully treated with Prozac.
he woman claims that she is not herself when she is not taking the
medicine, which calls for analyses ofmedically induced authenticity.
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he hypothetical cases begin with case 6, which discusses the possi-
bility that there is a difference in terms of authenticity between treating
a disorder with medicine and treating it with some other kind of therapy.
It is a feasible idea that one recovery process is more authentic than the
other. Case 7 is the concern that desiresmay sometimes be indoctrinated.
For instance, a personwho grows up in a religious sect and ismanipulated
into adopting some extreme worldview may have inauthentic desires.
Case 8 introduces a thought examplewhich, just as anorexia nervosa, has
been considered as a paradigm case of inauthenticity, namely a person
who fully conforms to the demands and expectations of others rather
than being motivated from his own self (Velleman 2002, p. 97). Finally,
case 9 builds on a thought example that I formulate in the Determining
Authenticity article, namely Anna, the professional ballet dancer.
I conclude in the article that the problems concern authenticity in
diòerent ways and from diòerent perspectives. Some of the problems,
namely (1), (2), and (9), should be phrased in terms of authentic decision-
making. hese can generally be treatedwith the theory developed in the
Autonomy article. Other problems, on the contrary, should be phrased
in terms of being an authentic person or being in an authentic condition.
hese need to be treated with some other theoretical approach than that
of this thesis. herefore, I argue that there is no universal solution to
authenticity-related problems but rather various particular solutions,
some of which are yet to be treated by applied ethicists.
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The Impossibility of Reliably Determining the Authenticity
of Desires: Implications for Informed Consent
Abstract: It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making
requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,”
“truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is
argued that amethod to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthen-
ticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics
displayed by diòerent theories of authenticity is introduced and applied
to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach
of treating them individually. he conclusion is drawn that, in practice,
the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested
that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent
practices in healthcare.
Keywords: Authenticity, autonomy, informed consent, decision-making,
healthcare
Introduction
Informed consent is a patient’s valid authorization or refusal of amedical
intervention; a process aiming at protecting patients’ autonomy. In its
elaborate form it is usually understood as informed, voluntary, and com-
petent consent (cf. Eyal 2012). Clinicians sometimes meet patients who
are competent, yetmake (at least seemingly) incomprehensible treatment
decisions.1 Some of those decisions can be described as inauthentic.
he question can be raised whether the authenticity of decisions
should be included as a criterion in informed consent to further pro-
1Competent according to, e.g., theMacCAT-T: a clinical tool to assess patients’ capacities to
make treatment decisions. See Grisso et al. (1997).
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tect patients with regards to their autonomy.2 In this article, I argue
that the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of desires cannot be reliably
detected. herefore, authenticity should not be part of informed con-
sent. A well-founded suspicion that a desire is inauthentic may call
for other measures than the invalidation of consent (or refusal), such
as amoral obligation to double-check that the patient is competent to
make healthcare decisions. However, the aim of this article is mainly
theoretical. Although some possible policy implications are suggested,
none is defended at length.
he paper is structured as follows. In “he problem of authenticity
and informed consent,” I elaborate on the problem of authenticity and
informed consent. In “A taxonomy of authenticity,” I introduce a tax-
onomy of characteristics displayed by theories of authenticity. In “he
taxonomy and the argument from testability,” I use the taxonomy to
evaluate the prospect of diòerent theories of authenticity to produce re-
liably observable consequences. Lastly, "Concluding remarks” contains
some concluding remarks.
The problem of authenticity and informed consent
Anna
Consider the hypothetical case of Anna, a young and promising profes-
sional ballet dancer. Anna loves her work. She has moved across the
nation to attend the best ballet schools, set aside personal relationships
when they conict with her career, and is known by friends and family
to love dancing “more than anything else.” Anna has suòered a serious
leg injury. To avoid the risk of having to go through an amputation that
will deûnitely end her career as a dancer, she must undergo a minor
surgery. She understands information relevant to her condition, is capa-
ble to reason about the potential risks and beneûts of diòerent treatment
2See, e.g., O’Shea, who raises the possibility of introducing authenticity as a necessary con-
dition of consent in order to distinguish between benign persuasion and undue inuence
(2011, pp. 30–1).
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alternatives, appreciates the nature of her situation, the consequences of
her choices, and so on. Yet, she refuses to undergo surgery.
here isno physiological or psychological disorder, such as a brain tu-
mor, untreated syphilis, or psychosis, that can be tied to Anna’s decision-
making. Neither is she being forced or unduly inuenced to make a
decision that accords with someone else’s interests, certain social rela-
tions, authoritative traditions, or anything else that might impinge on
the voluntariness of her choices. She plainly refuses to undergo surgery.
When reecting upon the case, her doctor considers Anna’s treat-
ment decisions to be “out of character.” She believes that Anna is not
being “herself,” which is why shemakes choices that are not “genuine.”
Nonetheless, the doctor must conclude, Anna is competent to make
treatment decisions; nothing in the informed consent process would
allow anyone to override Anna’s choices. However, if informed consent
had included a criterion of authenticity, Anna’s decisions could have
been invalidated on that basis. Her “true wishes” could then be adhered
to by forcing the measures necessary to save Anna from amputation.
herefore, the doctor contemplates whether or not the authenticity of
patients’ decisions should be part of informed consent.
he question arises in various contexts. For instance, anorexia ner-
vosa patients have stated that the disorder “was a part of themselves,
and therefore it would not be them if they recovered” (Tan et al. 2006b,
p. 278). Similarly, some peoplewith bipolar disorder have been reported
to ask whether certain experiences are due to their illness,medication,
or themselves (Hope et al. 2011, p. 21). And, brain tumors can entail
personality changes, such as in the case of a 40-year-oldmale who sud-
denly developed pedophilia (Burns and Swerdlow 2003). All examples
of cases in which the concept of authenticity can be invoked.
Authentic desires and informed consent
here are several interrelated problems concerning the question of
whether the authenticity of patients’ decisions should be part of in-
formed consent. First, it must be determined what authenticity is. Lexi-
cal deûnitions of “authentic” include descriptions such as “real or gen-
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uine,” “not copied or false,” “true and accurate,” and so on, but for moral
reasons it isnecessary to adopt amore detailed and systematized account,
i.e., a theory of authenticity.3 Second, amethodmust be developed that
enables observers to reliably recognize authenticity (or inauthenticity)
in others. Merely having a theory of authenticity does not suõce, as
the concept is (or is not) to be applied in a context in which interper-
sonal morality requires that interventions with other people’s lives and
liberties are justiûed. It is ûrst when these two matters are satisfacto-
rily settled that we are in a position to judge whether or not to include
authenticity in informed consent.
his article treats the second of the above stated problems. hus, I
do not aim to contribute to the philosophy of authenticity—although I
believe that this work does so indirectly—but merely to its applicability.
I claim to show that a method that enables observers to reliably rec-
ognize authenticity (or inauthenticity) in others cannot be developed.
However, this claim must be conditioned. First, I only take into consid-
eration theories of authenticity present in contemporary literature on
personal autonomy. Second,my claim is delimited by the fact that I only
treat theories in what is commonly called a procedural tradition of per-
sonal autonomy, which can be contrastedwith a substantial tradition. In
the procedural tradition, theorists are only concerned with the process
by which desires are formed and realized. In the substantial tradition,
theorists are also concerned with the content of a desire-holder’s desires
(see e.g. Oshana 2015). hird, I assume that authentic desires can be
treated without a well-articulated idea of what it is to be an authentic
person. his assumption requires some elaboration.
Much ofwhat has been said of authenticity is phrased as “preferences
stemming fromher true self,” and similar. he problemwith such phrases
is that they necessitate some idea of personhood. In the humanities, it
is a frequently debated problem what personhood is, or what it is to be
a person. Are we socially constituted beings, as some believe, or are we
3hese descriptions are from Merriam-Webster online. he arguments in this article do
not commit to any speciûc lexical deûnition of “authenticity,” but treats a number of sug-
gestions that have been proposed with regards to how the concept should be understood.
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self-made? Is tabula rasa a real thing? And, in all cases, to what extent?
I think that the current problem is possible to treat without engaging
in such debates. hat is, it should not matter to my argument or to
informed consent whether humans are socially constructed beings or if
we are something else. Whatever we are, I am here concerned only with
desires. In this context, I intend for desires to be understood as the basic
element in preference forming, i.e., basic pro-attitudes. herefore, I treat
theories of authenticity as theories of authentic desires—although these
oen include amix of propositions about “authentic selves,” “authentic
decisions,” “authentic preferences,” and so on.
Method
I approach the problem as follows. Sjöstrand and Juth recently con-
cluded that the concept of authenticity is “highly problematic to use
as a criterion for autonomous decision-making in healthcare” (2014,
p. 115). Although I agree with them, it is not my intention to merely
reproduce their arguments here. I wish to strengthen their conclusion
with new arguments. Sjöstrand and Juth only treat authenticity in the
context of psychiatric care. However, I use a method that allows me
to conclude that authenticity is problematic in the above sense in all
healthcare settings. Mymethod requires amore in-depth explanation
of the problem at hand.
Sjöstrand and Juth write the following (p. 121):
he practical question is which patients should be deemed inau-
thentic enough not to be granted certain rights typically granted
to patients considered fully autonomous—for instance, a right to
refuse treatment. Hence, we also need to have some idea about
how to test patients regarding the authenticity of their desires.
his seems to be very diõcult. . .
I call this the argument from testability. It is further developed in “he
argument from testability.” Here, it suõces to declare that it is more
signiûcant than Sjöstrand and Juth acknowledges. First, testability is
central to the problem of developing amethod that enables observers to
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reliably recognize authenticity (or inauthenticity) in others. Second, the
argument from testability applies in some form not only to the theory
of authenticity favored by Sjöstrand and Juth. If my thesis holds, the
argument from testability applies universally, and authenticity cannot
be reliably employed as a criterion in informed consent practices.
As stated above, I use a diòerent method than Sjöstrand and Juth’s.
hey go through a collection of theories of authenticity individually
and demonstrate in each case how that speciûc theory is awed. One
problem with that method is that it is space consuming. It requires of
the authors to briey summarize each theory—which paves the way
for misrepresentations—and to, just as briey, demonstrate precisely
what is wrong with it. Another problem is that many theories may be
le out of the analysis. By contrast, in this article, I introduce a tax-
onomy of characteristics displayed by diòerent theories of authenticity
that allows me to treat such theories categorically. hemethod is less
space consuming and its results more reliable, although it cannot be
guaranteed that the taxonomy covers all conceivable characteristics of
authenticity. Nonetheless,mymethod collects many theories of authen-
ticity, several of which have been highly inuential, and makes their
similarities and diòerences comprehensible.4 Even if my conclusion
is unconvincing, the taxonomy is still a valuable contribution to the
discussion of authenticity in autonomy theory.
A taxonomy of authenticity
The taxonomy
here aremany theories of authenticity.5 As is made clear above, I will
not attempt to go through them all here. However, I will account for
some distinctive elements that many theories share. his allows me to
organize characteristics displayed by diòerent theories of authenticity
4I am not aware of any theory that the taxonomy does not cover.
5In addition to those explicitly mentioned in this article, see, e.g., Buchanan and Brock
(1990), Chariand (2001), DeGrazia (2005), Faden and Beauchamp (1986), Freedman (1981),
Tännsjö (1999), Velleman (2002),Winnicott (2007).
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into tree distinct categories: sanctionist, originist, and coherentist. hese
are not formal deûnitions, but broad categories that distinguish diòerent
conceptualizations of authenticity. In sanctionist theories, i.e., theories
distinguished by characteristics typical of sanctionist ideals, authenticity
concerns the desire-holder’s attitude towards her desires. In originist
theories, authenticity concerns the origin of a desire. In coherentist
theories, authenticity concerns the coherence of a desire-holder’s set of
desires. his will be elaborated below. Furthermore, these categories
come in two classes: cognitivist and non-cognitivist. In cognitivist the-
ories, authenticity is amatter of rational deliberation; non-cognitivist
theories do not commit to that. hereby, non-cognitivist theories do not
reject rational deliberation altogether, theymerely do not commit to the
narrow view that authenticity is only amatter of rational deliberation.
A theory of authenticity can display characteristics from more than one
category. he classes on the other hand aremutually exclusive, so that a
theory is either one or the other.
hereby, the taxonomy takes the form of a three-by-two scheme.6 I
will go through the different categories and classes respectively, and illus-
trate their distinct features by using quotes and examples from theories
that display elements that are characteristic for each category and class.
Sanctionism
In sanctionist theories, authenticity concerns the desire-holder’s attitude
towards her desires. Desires that in one way or another are sanctioned by
the desire-holder are deemed authentic. Consider, for instance, Frankfurt,
whose idea of a person is that such a being identifies reflectively with her
desires, and Dworkin, who holds that it is crucial to a person’s autonomy
that she has the “capacity to raise the question ofwhether [she]will identify
withor reject the reasons forwhich [she]now act[s]” (Frankfurt 1971,pp. 10–
17;Dworkin 1988, p. 15). Similarly, Juth writes that “themost important
property of an authentic desire is that a person who has the desire would
6A third dimension could be added to the taxonomy,marking the degree to which a theory
displays the characteristic in question. However, my argument does not require such
elaborations and it will therefore be left out of the analysis.
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be inclined to approve of having that desire if she came to know why she
has it” (2005, p. 129). his is also the type of theory that Sjöstrand and Juth
favors: it is “the person’s own attitude towards the desire in the light of
knowledge about the origin that matters” (2014, p. 121).
According to sanctionist theories, the status of a desire in terms
of authenticity is determined bymeans of endorsement. Suppose that
Anna came to know exactly why she has the desire to refuse to undergo
theminor surgery that is necessary to avoid the risk of amputation. In
this hypothetical state ofmind, she is aware of everything that might
subconsciously inuence her desire forming; nothing regarding her
psychological and physiological behavioral patterns escapes her internal
gaze. Sanctionist theories suggest that Anna’s desires are authentic if
and only if Anna, in this hypothetical state ofmind, would endorse the
reasons for why she has the desire in question.
he above are examples of cognitivist sanctionist theories of authen-
ticity. According to them, authenticity is amatter of rational deliberation.
Frankfurt suggests that persons identify reectively with their desires
and Dworkin writes about a “capacity to raise the question” (emphasis
added; see quote above). Accordingly, Sjöstrand and Juth use the label
“Rationally endorsed desires” to describe theories such as these (p. 120;
emphasis added). I know of no non-cognitivist sanctionist theories, but
the taxonomymay allow us to formulate one. A theory could, perhaps,
be developed so that a desire is authentic only if the desire-holder expe-
riences an emotional inclination in favor of it.
Originism
In originist theories, authenticity concerns the origin of a desire. In a
manuscript, Tan et al. formulate an originist theory of authenticity as a
counterfactual statement: Authentic views are such that a person “would
have (or did have) if she did not suòer from [a disorder]” (2006a, p. 20).7
Similarly, but more elaborately, Elster argues when writing about the
rationality of desires that desires are inauthentic if they are “shaped by
7his is omitted in the published version of the article (Tan et al. 2006b).
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irrelevant causal factors, by a blind psychic causality operating ‘behind
the back’ of the person” (1983, p. 16; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014, p. 118). All
desires have a “causal origin, but some of them have the wrong sort of
causal history” (Elster 1983, p. 16). Elster continues by writing about
persons that “are in control over the processes whereby their desires are
formed,” stating that “autonomous [here: authentic] desires are desires
that have been deliberately chosen, acquired or modiûed—either by an
act of will or by a process of character planning” (p. 21). hus, according
to Elster, authentic desires are such that originate in some cognitive
process controlled by the desire-holder. hat is, Anna’s desire to refuse
to undergo surgery to avoid the risk of amputation could originate in
something that is beyond her cognitive control.
An example of an originist theory of authenticity that can be inter-
preted as non-cognitivist is found in Meyers. Arguing against Frankfurt
(see above),Meyers writes that having “an authentic self is best under-
stood as the result of an ongoing activity of persons” (2001, p. 199). he
authentic self is “the evolving collocation of attributes—analogous to
amusical ensemble’s sound—that issues from ongoing exercise of” a
repertory of skills of “introspection, imagination,memory, communica-
tion, reasoning, interpretation, and volition” that enable self-discovery
and self-deûnition (ibid). Elsewhere,Meyerswrites thatwhen exercising
such skills one “enacts one’s authentic self ” (2005, p. 49). Although the
theory is built on a cognitivist foundation, it is ultimatelynon-cognitivist.
Meyers writes that what “autonomous people do to understand and
deûne themselves is not aptly ûgured by any Euclidean shape or for-
mal reasoning pattern” (2001, p. 199). hus, enacting one’s authentic
self is not a rationalist enterprise. AMeyerean theory of authenticity
phrased in terms of desires could be formulated accordingly: desires
are authentic if and only if they originate in non-cognitivist processes




In coherentist theories, authenticity concerns the coherence of a desire-
holder’s set of desires. Christman argues that for a characteristic to be
authentic it must pass a self-critical reection, similar to that in cogni-
tivist sanctionist theories. However, the reection does here not target
the rational endorsement of having a certain desire, but whether the
characteristic in question can be “sustained as part of an acceptable
autobiographical narrative organized by her diachronic practical iden-
tity” (2009, p. 155). While sanctionism is an atomist theory focusing on
individual desires, coherentism is holist; authenticity here concerns a
whole body of desires.
Phrased in terms of desires, a Christmanean theory of authentic-
ity could be that a person’s desires are authentic if and only if they ût
with her socio-historical or autobiographical narrative. Anna’s desire
to refuse to undergo surgery does not ût with her socio-historical or
autobiographical narrative. She loves do dance “more than anything
else,” is known to have set aside personal relationships when they have
conicted with her career, and so on. Her present desires just do not ût.
he Christmanean theory is cognitivist. Similarly, albeit as an exam-
ple of a non-cognitivist coherentist theory,Miller writes (1981, p. 24):
Autonomy as authenticity means that an action is consistent
with the person’s attitudes, values, dispositions, and life plans.
Roughly, the person is acting in character. [. . . ] For an action
to be labeled “inauthentic” it has to be unusual or unexpected,
relatively important in itself or its consequences, and have no
apparent or proòered explanation.
hese are the categories and classes of characteristics displayed by dif-
ferent theories of authenticity. Below, the taxonomy is used to test such
theories categorically.
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The taxonomy and the argument from testability
The argument from testability
Most propositions and theories can be tested in several ways. One test
could, for instance, aim at identifying conceptual vaguenesses, ambi-
guities, and inconsistencies in theories of authenticity. he concern
of the argument from testability, however, is something else. heories
of authenticity will here not be evaluated as such. Since authenticity
is (or is not) to be applied in informed consent contexts, it is a neces-
sary criterion of a theory of authenticity that it renders observable and
testable consequences. herefore, it is only the prospect of the theories
producing empirically observable consequences, and the possibility of
evaluating those consequences, that is of interest here. Contemporary
theories of authenticity may be good in other respects, although it is
beyond the present purpose to assess that.
he taxonomy of characteristics displayed by diòerent theories of
authenticity allows us to evaluate the testability of theories of authen-
ticity categorically. If it is true that neither sanctionist, originist, nor
coherentist characteristics can produce observable and testable conse-
quences, no theory that builds on those elements and those elements
only achieves the requirement posed by the argument from testability.
In “Sanctionism” through “Coherentism,” I spell out what the argument
from testability requires of each category of characteristics, and show
that no such category passes the test.
Sanctionism
Suppose that Anna’s doctor is a sanctionist regarding authenticity. She
believes that for a desire to be authentic it must be hypothetically en-
dorsed by the desire-holder. here are two main reasons why this view
does not render any observable and testable consequences. First, as
Sjöstrand and Juth write (p. 121):
For one thing, it is oen diõcult to come up with a full explana-
tion as towhy we have a certain desire, and evenmore diõcult to
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make the necessary investigations in order to determinewhether
or not this explanation is correct.
his practical problem may be overcome, as discussed in “Originism”
below. But, in sanctionist theories, desire-holders are to transcend into
a state ofmind from which the status of a desire is assessed. here are
two possibilities here. Either that state ofmind is hypothetical, in which
case the theory cannot render observable consequences (but merely
hypothetical ones). Sanctionist theories are then not falsiûable. Or, it
is an actual state of mind. If it is an actual state of mind, observers
must evaluate whether the desire-holder transcends into it, into some
other state of mind, or if she does not transcend into anything at all.
Furthermore, theymust reliably determine whether valid endorsement
is actually taking place when the desire-holder is in that state ofmind.
To do so would require access to advanced (and currently unavailable)
neuro-imaging technology, in addition to an in-depth knowledge of the
psychological nature of endorsement. It would appear that sanctionism
is, at the very least, impractical.
In conclusion, sanctionism does not render observable and testable
consequences without technology and scientiûc knowledge yet unheard
of, if at all. hat entails that, at least as of today, amethod that enables
observers to reliably recognize authenticity (or inauthenticity) in others
cannot be grounded in sanctionist theories of authenticity only.
Originism
Suppose instead thatAnna’s doctor is an originist regarding authenticity.
She believes that for a desire to be authentic itmust originate in a process
controlled by the desire-holder. In practice, this view also fails to render
observable and testable consequences.8
Again quoting Sjöstrand and Juth, it is difficult “to come upwith a full
explanation as to why we have a certain desire, and even more difficult to
8As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the question of tracing the origins of a desire
may, at least partially, bemetaphysical rather than (socio-)psychological. hat may be
true, but metaphysical theses are not empirically testable, so I choose here not to address
the possibility ofmetaphysical origins of desires.
58
the determining authenticity article
make the necessary investigations in order to determine whether or not
this explanation is correct.” Observers face the insurmountable task of
tracing the origin of desires in hindsight and attempt to reliably determine
when they were formed. And, if that problem is resolved and the time
of origin detected, observers must also reliably determine whether the
desire-holder was in control over the desire-forming process at the time.
hese problems are signiûcant in theory, but plausibly impossible to
overcome in practice. Against scarcity of resources, healthcare practices
would have to developmanageable and eòectivemethods to examine the
origin of desires. Among other things, thosemethods would likely have
to include deep psychological analysis and a detailed socio-historical
biographical investigation. In addition to that, to determine whether
the desire-holderwas in control of the desire-forming process, it is likely
the case that themethods would have to include interviews with people
who were close to the desire-holder when the desires were initially
formed, and other similar measures. To complicate things further, these
investigations would also require the desire-holder’s informed consent.
To conclude, originist theories may render observable and testable
consequences in theory. However, to examine thematter would require
overwhelmingly complex and resource-demanding methods. herefore,
it is plausibly insurmountably diõcult for healthcare practices to reliably
recognize originist authenticity (or inauthenticity) in patients.
Coherentism
Suppose, then, that Anna’s doctor is a coherentist regarding authenticity.
She believes that authenticity concerns the coherence of a desire-holder’s
set of desires. Naturally, she thinks of Anna’s desire to refuse to undergo
minor surgery to avoid the risk of amputation as diverging. In short,
the desire does not ût.
Assessing the authenticity of Anna’s desire requires an exhaustive
list of her desires. In addition to her desire to move across the coun-
try, attend the best ballet schools, and set aside personal relationships
that conict with her career, it must include desires that may arise in
situations not immediately or obviously connected to the present one.
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he set must also include desires in unknown situations, e.g., such that
will arise in the future and of which nothing can be known. It cannot
be determined when a desire-set is full. herefore, observers cannot
reliably determine the coherence of a speciûc desire.
Prima facie, a reasonable way to circumvent the problem of compos-
ing an exhaustive desire-set is to in someway delimit the extent of the set,
although a reected judgment reveals that doing so implies making nor-
matively substantial decisions. Delimiting the set necessitates deciding
that some desires are irrelevant to the assessment. In fact, coherentism is
inherently normative (cf. Banner and Szmukler 2013, p. 390). It cannot
be explained why a diverging desire is inauthentic rather than the rest
of the desire-holder’s set of desires, without invoking the support of
normative auxiliary assumptions. hat is, Anna’s doctor cannot be sure
that it is not Anna’s desires to move across the country, attend the best
ballet schools, and set aside personal relationships that conict with her
career that are inauthentic. Empirical data, or incoherency as such, do
not reveal which piece of the desire pie that should be discarded; the
large or the small one. he truth of thematter cannot be discovered, but
must be decided.
An intuitively compelling example that corresponds to the case of
Anna is a person who suddenly reveals that she is homosexual, to the
surprise of everyone close to her. Her romantic desire toward others
of the same sex cannot be thought of as “inauthentic” only because it
deviates from her previously displayed desires, unless some normative
auxiliary assumption is invoked in favor of the largest piece of the desire
pie. herefore, coherentism is an inherently normative characteristic in
authenticity theory.
In conclusion, even if the problemof composing an exhaustive desire-
set is overcome, coherentist characteristics do not render observable and
testable consequences independent from normative auxiliary assump-
tions. herefore, amethod that enables observers to reliably recognize
authenticity (or inauthenticity) in others cannot be grounded in coher-
entist theories of authenticity only; it also requires amoral defense.
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Concluding remarks
Above, it has been shown that theories that build on characteristics cov-
ered by the taxonomy fail to meet the requirements set by the argument
from testability. However, that does not imply that we can be sure that
authenticity cannot be part of informed consent. heremight be charac-
teristics and theories that the taxonomy here introduced does not cover.
Furthermore, my assumption that authentic desires can be analyzed
without a well-articulated idea of authentic persons may bemistaken.
he same applies to my choice to only treat theories of authenticity
in the procedural tradition of personal autonomy theory. Substantial
theories of authenticity have been le out of the present analysis; they
may succeed where procedural theories do not. Lastly, the alternative
remains to begin with what can be reliably detected regarding desires
and develop a theory of authenticity thereaer—that is, to intentionally
put the cart before the horse.
However, ifmy assumptions are sound and the taxonomy is exhaus-
tive, in practice, the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of desires cannot
be reliably detected. herefore, authenticity should not be included as a
criterion in informed consent.
Nonetheless, seemingly inauthentic behavior from patients may trig-
ger the need to take other actions than invalidating consent (or refusal).
Anna’s doctor may, for instance, bemorally obliged to double-check that
Anna is able to comprehend the nature of her situation. Or, surprising
desires such as Anna’s might prompt the need for alternative commu-
nicativemeasures, e.g., the use of pedagogical tools, or perhaps another
doctor’s aõrmation that the information the patient has received is cor-
rect. However, it is beyond the limits of this article to further treat moral
obligations that may arise from a suspicion of inauthenticity. Any de-
tailed policy suggestions based on the conclusions drawn in this article
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What Justifies Judgments of Inauthenticity?
Abstract: he notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or
“true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy,
so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous
decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that
authenticity is diõcult to observe in others. herefore, judgments of
inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic
interventions, among other things. his article delineates what justiûes
judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to
live according to the prevailing social andmoral standards and desires
that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justiûed
to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal
factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from
the person’s practical identity. he article contributes to a tradition of
thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and
Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity
and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.
Keywords: Authenticity, autonomy, decision-making, paternalism, bio-
ethics
Introduction
Personal autonomy, i.e., self-determination, is a central notion in con-
temporary bioethics. Generally speaking, a person is autonomous if
she is self-governed. Factors that undermine autonomy include, for
instance, lacking decision-making capacities and controlling inuences
such as coercion or manipulation. Sometimes authenticity, i.e., being
“genuine,” “real,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is held as critical to a per-
son’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making
autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It is a bioethical
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problem how authenticity should be understood. Various theories have
been proposed with the intention of conceptualizing authenticity; none
takes complete precedence over others.
In practice, the notion is relevant mainly in considerations of what
justiûes judgments of inauthenticity. For instance, patients suòering
from borderline personality disorder (BPD) sometimes display sudden
and dramatic shis in goals, values, vocational aspirations, choice of
friends, and so on (Lester 2009, p. 284). During a short time span, a
BPD patient can both request medication, as only that enables her to go
through psychotherapy, and refusemedication, as one of its side eòects
is that it clouds her thinking. Healthcare personnel cannot adhere to
both wishes. Caretakers with autonomy-promoting or paternalistic
ambitions may be interested in whether it is justiûed to treat any of
the BPD patient’s decisions as inauthentic, and if so, on what grounds.
Other examples include late stage schizophrenics who are completely
indiòerent to how their lives go (cf. American Psychiatric Association
2013) and anorectics who report that they would rather die than gain
weight (Tan et al. 2006). In such cases, it is sometimes relevant to ask
whether it is justiûed to treat patients’ wishes as inauthentic.
hus, there is a three-step problem regarding the notion of authen-
ticity. First, it is unclear under which conditions something or someone
is authentic or inauthentic. Second, it is diõcult to know whether
something or someonemeets those conditions. Mainly for reasons of
epistemic uncertainty, it is therefore unclear what justiûes the judgment
that something or someone is inauthentic. hird, some paternalistic
or authenticity-promoting interventions may also be justiûed in light
of judgments of inauthenticity. his article is only concerned with the
second step of this three-step problem.
I argue that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing
social andmoral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable
according to those standards, it is justiûed to judge that a desire is inau-
thentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the
person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical iden-
tity. My arguments in this article contribute to a tradition of thinking
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about authenticity which is mainly known from Frankfurt (1971) and
Dworkin (1988) and has recently been supported by Juth (2005) and
DeGrazia (2005), among others. However,my contribution ismore prac-
tical than the theoretical ideals proposed by those authors; this article is
an attempt to bridge the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity
and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.
he article has two main sections and is structured as follows. In
the ûrst main section, I elaborate on how the notion of authenticity is
relevant to biomedicine and introduce two recent attempts to collect
theories of authenticity in taxonomies. I spell out my proposal of what
justiûes judgments of inauthenticity in the second main section. My
proposal builds on the arguments in the ûrst section, which is why the




Autonomy is one of the main guiding principles in contemporary
bioethics. In the standardmodel of autonomy, a person is autonomous
with respect to her desires or actions to the extent that they are due to her
own self, and not due to some other inuencing force, be it internal or
external to her (cf. Taylor 2005a). Bioethicists usually invoke two main
notions with regard to patients’ autonomy; decision-making capacity
and voluntariness. hat is, if a patient is competent to make healthcare
decisions, according to, e.g.,MacCAT-T standards of decisional-capacity
(Grisso et al. 1997), and does so without undue inuences internal or
external to the patient (Nelson et al. 2011),most bioethicists agree that
the patient’s decisions should be respected. Sometimes a third notion
is raised, namely that of authenticity. he reasons vary. A patient may
make healthcare decisions that seem to be “out of character,” or that seem
to conform to others’ wishes rather than to her own, or shemay suòer
from somemedical disorder that seems to aòect her values. Accordingly,
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the notion of authenticity has increasingly gained theorists’ attention
(see, e.g., Bauer 2017; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014; White 2018).
It has become clear that there is no consensus regarding how au-
thenticity should be understood, or what exactly it may add to the
concern for patients’ autonomy. To the contrary, various theoretical
approaches are present in bioethical conversations, none of which takes
precedence over others and, arguably, none ofwhichmanages to solve all
authenticity-related problems that bioethicists have raised. Below, I ac-
count for two attempts to collect theories of authenticity in taxonomies
that enable overview and analysis. hese accounts will be relevant to
the arguments in the subsequent section. However, before proceeding,
some delimitations are necessary.
he notion of authenticity has been understood to apply to diòer-
ent things. Some argue that it is the authenticity of persons that is of
importance to autonomy theory (cf. Bauer 2017). Others hold that it is
the authenticity of a person’s life that should be considered (cf. Taylor
1991). Although both perspectives are important, I am here concerned
with a third possibility, namely, the authenticity of desires. For the
present purposes I take desires to be themost basic element in ordinary
preference-forming and, thus, a basic element in decision-making. In
brief, I hold that autonomy inmedical settingsmainly concerns decision-
making, in the sense that bioethicists are interested in whether patients
make autonomous healthcare decisions. herefore, I phrase concerns of
authenticity in terms of the authenticity of decisions, or more precisely
in terms of the authenticity of desires.1
he notion of authenticity is relevant in several ways. A general
theory of authenticity can be applied in common autonomy-protecting
practices, such as, e.g., informed consent (cf. Eyal 2012). It is possible
that such practices can be developed in light of insights from authenticity
theory so that they betterprotectpatient autonomy. But thenotion is also
relevant for paternalistic reasons. Sometimes, the principle of respect for
autonomy is overridden by concerns for a patient’swell-being. Although
1Also, the focus on desires is common in the theoretical traditionwhich I aim to contribute
to; see, e.g., Noggle (2005), Sjöstrand and Juth (2014), and Taylor (2005b).
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compulsory care is rare, it is occasionally considered necessary. And, in
some of those cases, the decision to put a patient in compulsory care is
made with support from judgments of inauthenticity. hat is, patients
are sometimes subjected to compulsory care because they display what
seems to be inauthentic desires (cf. Tan et al. 2006).
It must be noted that paternalistic interventions are not justiûed
simply because a desire is found to be inauthentic. Paternalism requires
support from independent moral arguments, such as the necessary
degree of epistemic certainty of inauthenticity and the reasonable pro-
portionality of the intervention. his article does not seek to provide
practical guidance in thosematters. It is beyond the scope of the present
purposes to elaborate more precisely on the relationship between au-
thenticity, autonomy, and paternalism. Here, the only concern is to
determine what justiûes judgments of inauthenticity.
Finally, I do not claim that my proposal is the only way to justify
judgments of inauthenticity. he conclusion is not phrased in terms
of necessary and suõcient conditions but should be understood as
generally reason-giving in a larger framework of reective equilibrium.
hus, applying it in practice requires substantial moral deliberation (cf.
Beauchamp and Rauprich 2016).
Two taxonomies of authenticity theories
here have been two recent attempts at collecting theories of authenticity
in taxonomies; Noggle (2005) and Ahlin (2018). Noggle’s taxonomy
is important to the arguments in the next section as it distinguishes
between so-called procedural and substantive theories of authenticity.
he taxonomy I have proposed is important because it eshes out two
diòerent kinds of theories that are conated in Noggle’s taxonomy. As
will be explained, these theories are fundamental to the arguments in
the next section.
Noggle’s taxonomy builds on the observation that theories of au-
thenticity begin with a base clause (2005, p. 88):
Element (or set of elements) E1 of the psychology of person S is
authentic if. . .
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hen, he orders different theories afterwhich conditions they add to com-
plete the clause. hree families of theories emerge (Noggle 2005, p. 88):
Structural Condition Schema: E1 is related in the right way to
E2, where E2 is some other element (or group of elements) of S’s
psychology.
Historical Condition Schema: E1 arose in the right way.
Substantive Condition Schema: E1 has the right content or causes
S to believe, desire, intend, or do the right things.
Examples of “structural condition theories” include thenotable autonomy
theories proposed by Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin (1988). According
to those theories, a desire is authentic if the desire-holder identifies with
it on a higher level of reflection. To illustrate,Noggle uses the example of
an addict who has a first-order desire to use drugs, and a second-order
desire to not use drugs: “When a person has both a first-order desire
and a second-order desire not to have the first-order desire [. . . ] this
repudiated first-order desire is properly regarded as ‘a force other than his
own”’ (p. 89). hus, in those theories, a desire (element E1) is authentic if
it complies with higher-level desires (E2). Structural condition theories
have been supported in recent writings by, among others, Christman
(2009), DeGrazia (2005), and Sjöstrand and Juth (2014).
In “historical condition theories,” desires are authentic if they have
the right sort of causal history. “hemotivating idea behind historical
conditions seems to be that a psychological element is authentic if its
history is free of the kinds of inuences [. . . ] that seem to undermine
authenticity” (Noggle 2005, pp. 93–94). Noggle refers to Dworkin, who
oòers examples of conditions that form the kind of inuence that negates
authenticity; “hypnotic suggestion,manipulation, coercive persuasion,
subliminal inuence, and so forth” (1988, p. 18).
Lastly, in contrast to the prior families of theories, “substantive
condition theories” are not content-neutral. In substantive condition
theories, the content of desires matter to the authenticity of the desires.
he following is a hypothetical case which is sometimes used as an
example to distinguish between substantive theories and content-neutral
theories. Suppose that a woman lives with aman that regularly abuses
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her physically and verbally. he woman could choose to leave theman
but chooses not to do so. Are the desires underlying woman’s choice not
to leave theman authentic?
Content-neutral theories of authenticity are concerned with the pro-
cesses of her choosing. hey could conclude that the woman’s choice
rests on authentic desires. InNoggle’s terminology, thewoman’s decision-
making processes could be structurally or historically conditioned so
that there is no ground for concluding that her choice builds on inau-
thentic desires (although this conclusion is improbable).
By contrast, a substantive theory could reach the opposite conclusion,
on the grounds that no matter how the woman’s decision-making pro-
cesses are structurally or historically conditioned, the desire to stay with
an abusing man cannot be authentic because it is the desire to stay with
an abusing man; the desire has the wrong content. he reasons why the
content iswrong vary between different substantive theories. For instance,
one possible explanation is that one cannot authentically desire to fully
submit oneself to the wishes of someone else. Submitting oneself fully to
others’ wishes is to resign as amoral agent, which goes against the very
idea of authenticity; one distinguishing factor between inauthenticity and
authenticity is that the latter has to do with being self-driven in some
sense. he woman cannot authentically choose to submit herself to the
man, because one cannot authentically wish to be else-driven.
Content-neutral theories are commonly called “procedural.” Pro-
cedural theorists hold that a theory of authenticity should be content-
neutral mainly because it should not be moralizing or enable undue
paternalism. Essentially, it should be content-neutral because it should
bemorally neutral. heorists from the substantivist tradition disagree,
not least because of the reasons invoked above. he debate between the-
orists from the two traditions is ongoing (cf. Christman 2004; Oshana
2015), and while the distinction between procedural and substantive
theories is relevant in the next section it may be le without further
elaboration here.
he taxonomy I have proposed is not of authenticity theories, but of
features that various theories share. In the taxonomy, diòerent theories
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of authenticity are divided into three categories according to unique fea-
tures. he categories are sanctionism, originism, and coherentism (Ahlin
2018, pp. 45–47).2 Here, by “sanctionist theories,” for instance, I intend
a hypothetical theory which only displays sanctionist features, although
the wording is only for pedagogical reasons; authenticity theories can
display features from more than one category, and to diòerent degrees.
One strength of this taxonomy is that it shows that two distinct families
of theories are conated in Noggle’s taxonomy, namely, those that em-
phasize aõrmative self-reection and those that emphasize coherence.
his is elaborated on below. One weakness is that the taxonomy only
collects features shared by procedural theories of authenticity.
I call the distinguishing feature of sanctionist theories “aõrmative
self-reection.” his feature is similar to the structural condition schema
inNoggle’s taxonomy. Easily put, aõrmative self-reection is to critically
scrutinize one’s own desires and approve of the result. For instance,
suppose that a patient came to know precisely why she has the desire
to refuse amedical intervention, reected critically upon those causes,
and concluded that she supports having the desire. he patient would
have engaged in aõrmative self-reection and, according to sanctionist
theories, her desire to refuse would be authentic.
he distinguishing feature of originist theories is very similar to the
historical condition schema in Noggle’s taxonomy. In originist theories,
desires are inauthentic if they have the wrong sort of origin. One example
of an inauthentic desire is onewhich is “shaped by irrelevant causal factors,
by a blind psychic causality operating ‘behind the back’ of the person”
(Elster 1983, p. 16). Elsterwrites that “desires that have been deliberately
chosen, acquired or modified—either by an act of will or by a process of
character planning” are authentic (p. 21). hat is, desires are authentic if
they originate in the right kind of cognitive processes. On another originist
account, desires are authentic if theyoriginate in processesof self-discovery
and self-definition (Ahlin 2018, p. 46; cf. Meyers 2001, 2005).
2Each category can be divided in two classes, namely cognitivism and non-cognitivism,
although these will be le out of the present analysis.
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By introducing coherentism, the ûnal category in my taxonomy, a
distinguishing feature is eshed out that is conated in the structural
condition schema in Noggle’s taxonomy. In coherentist theories, desires
that deviate from the desire-holder’s full set of desires are inauthentic.
For instance, inChristman’s theory of autonomy, a desire is authentic if it
is not “alienated” upon self-reection, “given one’s diachronic practical
identity and one’s position in the world” (2009, p. 155). he notion
of “practical identity” should here be understood to mean “a certain
pattern of thinking and reactingwhich, generally speaking, is ours alone;
it marks our character and personality” (p. 150). In short, a desire is
inauthentic if it does not ût with how the desire-holder’s identity has
developed over time, and how the identity is presently being sustained.
Similarly,Miller argues that an action (here: desire) is inauthentic if it is
“unusual or unexpected, relatively important in itself or its consequences,
and [has] no apparent or proòered explanation” (1981, p. 24). hus, in
coherentist theories, desires are inauthentic if they are deviating.
Judgments of inauthenticity
The structure of the argument
In this section, I spell out my proposal of what justifies judgments of
inauthenticity. In short, the argument has three elements. he first element
is a normative thesis determining underwhich conditions judgments of
inauthenticity are justified. It is introduced in the next subsection. he
second element is a set of indicators of inauthenticity, i.e., empirical factors
that indicate whether the conditions in the first element are met. It is
introduced in a subsequent section. he third element,which is also spelled
out in an independent subsection, is a clause that delimits the scope of
desires and desire-holderswhichmay be justifiably subjected to judgments
of inauthenticity. In a final subsection, the elements are collected and
formulated as a proposal of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity.
I think of my arguments as contributing to theories in the sanc-
tionist tradition. he tradition is themost inuential, and any serious
contribution to it should be of interest to autonomy theorists in general.
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However, I do not intend to defend sanctionism as such here; that is a
diòerent project. his also means that my arguments are intended to
be neutral with regard to the content of desires, and thus only concern
their procedural forms.
The dissenting self-reflection thesis
It has been pointed out that sanctionist theories suffer from epistemic prob-
lems that are difficult to overcome. Sjöstrand and Juthwrite (2014, p. 21):
For one thing, it is oen diõcult to come up with a full explana-
tion as towhy we have a certain desire, and evenmore diõcult to
make the necessary investigations in order to determinewhether
or not this explanation is correct.
It may be added that even if this problem is solved, it is also difficult
to know whether affirmative self-reflection actually takes place (Ahlin
2018, p. 47):
[Observing a desire-holder’s endorsement of a desire] would
require access to advanced (and currently unavailable) neuro-
imaging technology, in addition to an in-depth knowledge of
the psychological nature of endorsement. It would appear that
sanctionism is, at the very least, impractical. [It] does not render
observable and testable consequences without technology and
scientiûc knowledge yet unheard of, if at all.
However, sanctionism remains a valid and strong theoretical ideal. Con-
sider this thesis,which is formulatedwith sanctionism as a starting point:
he dissenting self-reection thesis: Judgments of inauthentic-
ity are justiûed if there is suõcient reason to believe that the
desire-holder would disapprove of having the desire upon in-
formed and critical self-reection.
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In it, affirmative self-reflection is re-stated as a negative. he dissenting
self-reflection thesis does not claim to distinguish between authentic
and inauthentic desires. he thesis states the conditions under which it is
justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic,whichmeans that there could
be inauthentic desires that observers for some reason are not justified to
call inauthentic. Although the thesis is sanctionist, it is more practical
than the theoretical ideal. It facilitates the quest for empirical indicators
of inauthenticity. From an observer’s epistemically inadequate point of
view there aremany reasons for a desire-holder to approve of her own
desires, while reasons to disapprove of them are fewer, or at least easier to
identify. hat is, things that indicate inauthenticity are easier to observe
than things that indicate authenticity. herefore, re-stating affirmative
self-reflection as a negative has at least onemajor epistemicmerit.
It also has at least one moral merit. he dissenting self-reflection
thesis includes a tacit assumption of authenticity; desires should be judged
as authentic unless there is evidence of the opposite. here are moral
reasons supporting this view. For instance, taking other people seriously,
i.e., listening to what they say, respecting their wishes, treating them as
“ends in themselves,” and so on, seems to require the assumption that they
are acting from authentic desires. he dissenting self-reflection thesis
complies with those reasons through its tacit assumption of authenticity.
herefore, there is at least onemoral merit in building from the dissenting
self-reflection thesis rather than from theses of affirmative self-reflection.
he aim of the arguments inwhat follows is to determinewhen there
is reason to believe that a desire-holder would disapprove of having a
desire upon informed and critical self-reection. he aim is empirical.
hat is, the aim is to identify empirical factors that indicate that a desire is
inauthentic. I have found two possible candidates in the recent literature
on authenticity that, when combined, indicate inauthenticity. hey are
spelled out dialectically aer this short but important subsection on a
ûxed point in the analysis.
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A fixed point in the analysis
On the standard account of reective equilibrium, the analysis allows for
“ûxed points” that are less sensible to re-evaluation than other matters
included in the inquiry (Daniels 2016; Rawls 2001, pp. 29–30). For an
illustration, the thesis that it is wrong to torture innocents for mere
amusement can be held as a ûxed point in an analysis of, for instance,
the ethics of war. he present analysis holds one thesis as a ûxed point,
namely the following.
In one famous case, a 40-year oldman developed a sexual interest in
children that was later found to be causally connected to a brain tumor
(Burns and Swerdlow 2003). When the tumorwas removed thepedophilic
symptoms disappeared. After some time, theman displayed the same
symptoms again, and upon examination itwas found that the brain tumor
had returned. he causal connection between theman’s brain tumor and
his sexualdesires is clearbeyond reasonable doubt. hemanwent through
various medical procedures and a 12-step program for sexual addicts to
be able to return to his family and his prepubescent stepdaughter, towards
whom he had previouslymade subtle sexual advances.
Here, for reasons of stable and considered intuitions, I hold this
thesis as a ûxed point: It is justiûed to treat the man’s sexual desires
as inauthentic. Holding the thesis as a ûxed point does not entail any
normative commitments. For instance, it does not mean that I do not
hold theman accountable for his actions, or that I would support forced
medical interventions aiming to remove the tumor or counteract its
causal eòects. I merely believe that few or no real cases are better suited
to be held as ûxed points in the present analysis; if it is not justiûed to
treat theman’s sexual desires as inauthentic, it is perhaps never justiûed
to treat any desire as inauthentic.
Indicators of inauthenticity
he originist (or “historical condition”) view that desires are authentic
if they have the right sort of causal history is intuitively compelling. De-
sires that are “shaped by irrelevant causal factors” that operate “behind
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the back” of the desire-holder seem to be prima facie inauthentic. It is
therefore an indicator of inauthenticity:
he ûrst indicator of inauthenticity: It is a reason to believe
that a desire-holder would disapprove of having a desire upon
informed and critical self-reection if it is known that the desire
is due to causal factors that are not normal to how the desire-
holder is otherwise construed, taking both physical andmental
dispositions into consideration.
Applying it to the ûxed point-case, the indicator provides a plausible
explanation for why it is justiûed to treat the man’s sexual desires as
inauthentic. However, it requires some elaboration.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that theman had lived with the
brain tumor and its causal influences from birth. He could then have
felt a deep and stable connection between his personality and his sexual
preferences (disregarding whether he found them morally acceptable)
and developed a social identity and a way of life thereafter. He could, for
instance, have thought of himself that, “I am the sort of person who can-
not live close to playgrounds and schools,” and decided to live in solitude,
cultivating an interest in botany, rock-climbing, or literature. In this case,
the brain tumor is normal to how the man is otherwise construed. It
would be less justified to believe that theman would disapprove of his
desires upon informed and critical self-reflection. Perhaps it would not
be justified at all, as the hypothetical man is known to feel a deep and
stable connection between his personality and his sexual preferences.
herefore, the clause in the indicator stating that the causal factors must
not be normal to how the desire-holder is otherwise construed is impor-
tant. he clause also introduces a person-specific quality to judgments
of inauthenticity, as what is normal to one person may not be normal to
another (which the example in this paragraph illustrates).
However, the ûrst indicator of inauthenticity does not have universal
explanatory power. Consider, as a counterexample, a case in which a
brain tumor causes a person to have desires that she already has. For
instance, a sugar addict may havemany reasons to love sugar. Perhaps
her parents rewarded her with candy in her early childhood, thus “pro-
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gramming” her to have a certain cognitive attitude to sugar, and perhaps
she lives next to a chocolate factory and cannot resist the always-present
scent of sweets in her neighborhood. Suppose that this person develops
a brain tumor causing her to have a desire for sugar. he tumor’s causal
inuences would be just one among many others, and it is therefore not
obvious that the sugar addict would disapprove of having those desires
upon informed and critical self-reection. It should be concluded that
although the ûrst indicator is reason-giving, it does not by itself provide
suõcient reason for judgments of inauthenticity to be justiûed.
he literature on authenticity includes other possible indicators of
inauthenticity. Consider the coherentist view that a desire is inauthentic
if it does not ût with the desire-holder’s practical identity. It renders a
second indicator:
he second indicator of inauthenticity: It is a reason to believe
that a desire-holder would disapprove of having a desire upon
informed and critical self-reection if it is known that the de-
sire does not cohere with how the desire-holder’s identity has
developed over time and is presently being sustained.
Applying the indicator to the ûxed point-case, it provides an explanation
why it is justiûed to treat theman’s sexual desires as inauthentic. But, it
needs to be elaborated.
People in general are rarely fully coherent beings. It is likely that
most or all of us have conicting desires. his is even more certain if
we think of humans as intertemporal beings that exist over time; few
people have fully coherent desire-sets over time from childhood to old
age. herefore, the second indicator should be understood as pointing
at very serious deviations. A hypothetical person’s desire to drink beer
for lunch and desire to be sober in the aernoon are conicting, but the
conict is not serious enough for it to be justiûed to judge any of the two
desires as inauthentic. But, in the ûxed point-case, theman had deep
sexual desires that were at odds with other deep desires, such as that of
being part of a loving family and have a normal social life. His sexual
desires negated life plans that were important to him. herefore, they
are serious enough to be a reason to believe that a desire is inauthentic.
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However, as with the ûrst indicator, the second indicator of inau-
thenticity lacks universal explanatory power. Consider, for instance, a
person who does not suòer from a brain tumor, but who begins to act
upon pedophilic desires because of the sudden realization that he has
them. hat is, suppose that theman’s sexual desireswere not due to some
non-normal causal factor, but that they were latent and emerged upon
new stimuli. It would then not matter to judgments of inauthenticity
that the desires conict with theman’s practical identity. herefore, as
with the ûrst indicator of inauthenticity, it should be concluded that al-
though the second indicator is reason-giving it does not by itself provide
suõcient reason for judgments of inauthenticity to be justiûed.
he two indicators seem to complement each other. Consider them
in combination:
A combination of the two indicators of inauthenticity: here
is reason to believe that a desire-holder would disapprove of
having a desire to the extent that the desire is known to be due
to causal factors that are not normal to how the desire-holder
is otherwise construed, taking both physical andmental dispo-
sitions into consideration, and to the extent that the desire is
known to be incoherent with how the desire-holder’s identity
has developed over time and is presently being sustained.
he combination explains why it is justiûed to treat the man’s sexual
desires as inauthentic in the ûxed point-case, while withstanding the
counterarguments that have been directed to the two indicators of inau-
thenticity as separate indicators. It avoids the argument directed to the
ûrst indicator regarding new factors that cause people to hold desires
that they already have; because they are not deviating, they do not jus-
tify judgments of inauthenticity. It also avoids the argument directed
to the second indicator regarding normal factors causing incoherent
desires; because the factors are not of a certain kind, they do not justify
judgments of inauthenticity. hus, the combination seems to provide a
reasonable explanation while withstanding criticism that refute the two
indicators of inauthenticity as separate indicators.
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However, there are forceful counterexamples also to the combina-
tion of the two indicators. Suppose that theman in the ûxed point-case
already was a pedophile, but that the brain tumor caused his sexual de-
sires in children to disappear. he causal factors would not be normal to
how he is otherwise construed, and his new set of desires would be seri-
ously incoherentwith his practical identity, yet it seems counterintuitive
to conclude that it is justiûed to believe that theman would disapprove
of his new desire-set upon informed and critical self-reection. On the
contrary, hemight view the brain tumor as a blessing.
his counterexample is diòerent from the previous; it targets the
content of the desires rather than their procedural forms and thus comes
from what in Noggle’s terminology is called a “substantive condition
schema.” And, it seems to succeed in one aspect; the combination of the
two indicators only seems to justify judgments of inauthenticity when
the desires under scrutiny are bad, in some sense. When the desires
are good, in some sense, the combination provides counterintuitive
conclusions. his can be further illustrated.
In his popular book heManWho Mistook HisWife for a Hat, the
neurologist Oliver Sacks reports of a 90-year-old woman who had no-
ticed a “change” (1985, Ch. 11). Around her 88th birthday, she had begun
to feel energetic, alive, younger; she had always been shy, but now she
irted with young men,made jokes, and had fun. Her friends thought
that her frisky behavior was inappropriate at her age. he woman was
feeling extremely well—too well—and realized that it could be “Cupid’s
disease.” She had received treatment in her youth, but the infection had
only been suppressed, not eradicated. he woman was right, she had
neurosyphilis. Upon conûrmation of her hypothesis, the woman stated
that she did not want to be cured from the infection, as she enjoyed its
positive eòects, but that she did not want it to get worse either.3 Con-
trary to what the combination of the two indicators would suggest, the
woman did not disapprove of her desires upon informed and critical
self-reection, in spite of the fact that they were both alien and deviating.
3Sacks eventually found a treatment that conformed to the woman’s wishes.
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hus, the combination seems to justify judgments of inauthenticity
when the desires under scrutiny are bad in some sense, but not when
they are good in some sense.4 his observation needs to be sorted out
and answered.
A delimiting clause
he dialectic in the above subsection builds on theories and proposi-
tions from the procedural tradition of autonomy theorizing. Yet, the
ûnal counterexample which convincingly refutes the combination of
the two indicators of inauthenticity seems to be substantive. he exam-
ple succeeds in showing that the combination only renders plausible
conclusions regarding desires with a certain kind of content. hus, the
dialectic appears to rest on tacit substantive assumptions that must be
made explicit and explained.
In the ûxed point-case, the assumption is that it would be better for
theman to not have those sexual desires. It would be better according
to objectivemoral standards, as not being a pedophile is morally better
than being one. he clause could be added to the combination of the
two indicators, “unless the desire is better according to objectivemoral
standards.” Judgments of when there is suõcient reason to believe that
a desire-holder would disapprove of a desire would then be normative.
Such moralizations are precisely what proceduralists wish to avoid. he
substantive assumption that must bemade explicit can therefore not be
objective in the sense reected by this line of thought.
It would also be better for theman to not have those sexual desires
according to his own subjective moral standards. It can reasonably be
assumed that theman did notwant to have those desires, as he underwent
a 12-step program for sexual addicts in addition to the various medical
procedures to be able to return to his family. A different clause could
thus be added to the combination, “unless the desire is better according
to subjective moral standards.” However, judgments of inauthenticity
4One plausible line of thought is instead that judgments of inauthenticitymay be justified in
either case, but that they are only interesting when the desire under scrutiny is bad in some
sense. However,mainly for reasons of space, this possibility is not further explored here.
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would then be self-referential and non-guiding. he full theory would
essentially carry themeaning, “there is reason to believe that the desire-
holder would disapprove of having the desire if it is new and deviating,
unless the desire-holder approvesofhaving it,” or simply, “the desire-holder
would disapprove of having the desire unless she approves of having it.”
herefore, the substantive assumption that must bemade explicit cannot
be subjective in the sense reflected by this line of thought either.
However, there is one possiblemiddle-way between those two lines
of thought. he following delimiting clause can be added:
Delimiting clause: Here, judgments of inauthenticity only target
desire-holders who are known to carry a general wish to live ac-
cording to the prevailing social andmoral standards, and desires
that are seriously undesirable according to those standards.
heman in the ûxed point-case is such a desire-holder, which is known
from his eòorts to defeat the symptoms of his brain tumor, and his
desires are undesirable accordingly, which is known from observations
of the prevailing social and moral standards. More fully spelled out,
the judgment is then that there is reason to believe that the man in
the ûxed point-case would disapprove of having his desires as they are
alien, incoherent, and undesirable according to the standards which it is
known that hewishes to follow. he delimiting clause also goeswellwith
the old woman whose syphilis caused her to have alien and deviating
desires. Her friskymood and behavior is not undesirable enough either
socially or morally. herefore, the woman’s desires are not of the kind
that may justiûably be targeted by judgments of inauthenticity.
I expect four immediateobjections to the delimiting clause. Each isdue
to the fact that it brings normative content into judgments of inauthenticity.
First, proceduralist protests can be expected. Proceduralists hold
that judgments of inauthenticity should be content-neutral because they
should bemorally neutral. However, they should not worry. here is
no risk for undue paternalism, as the clause also states that judgments
of inauthenticity here only target people who are known to wish to live
according to the same normative content that the judgment builds on.
And, the normative content does not concern the distinction between
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authentic and inauthentic desires, but when it is justiûed to treat desires
as inauthentic, i.e., an inherently normative problem. here must be
moralization, and proceduralists should grant that applying the desire-
holder’s own moral standards is at least less problematic than applying
someone else’s.
Second, it may be objected that adding the delimiting clause to the
theory entails that judgments of inauthenticity would be self-referential
and non-guiding, in the sense discussed above. he full theory would
essentially carry the meaning, “the desire-holder would disapprove
of having the desire unless she approves of having it.” he objection
obscures an important diòerence between the two additions. In the
above discussion, the worry of circularity is due to the fact that the
addition to the combination reads, “unless the desire is better according
to subjective moral standards.” In that addition, the desire-holder’s
attitude to the speciûc desire which is under scrutiny is known and
added to the analysis. In the delimiting clause, on the contrary, nothing
is said about any speciûc desire. Instead, the delimiting clause adds the
desire-holder’s attitude toward the prevailing social andmoral standards
(according to which speciûc desires may be good or bad). hereby, the
addition is substantive enough to be analytically potent, while being
suõciently content-neutral to avoid being problematically circular.
hird, substantivist protests can also be expected. Substantivists
hold that the content of a desire should be of a certain kind for the desire
to be authentic, and the normative content which is here brought into
judgments of inauthenticity is not objective. If the prevailing moral
standards are wicked, that wickedness is brought into the judgment
and is thus acted upon—surely, the substantivist might say, it must be
wrong in and by itself to act upon wickedmoral standards. However,
the task is here to justify judgments of inauthenticity in light of the
desire-holder’s values. In all other matters, it is a value-neutral project.
he current project aims to contribute to the justiûcation of judgments
of the possible inauthenticity of desire-holders’ wicked views, not the
justiûcation of their views as such.
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Fourth, delimiting the analytical scope to desire-holders who are
known to wish to live according to the prevailing social andmoral stan-
dards may entail that a lot of people are left out. he current analysis
does not provide guidance with regard to people whose values andmoti-
vational sets are unknown or deviating from the prevailing social and
moral standards. My answer is simply that including those people is not
morally justified, precisely because their values andmotivational sets are
unknown or deviating. he present theory ultimately aims to be proce-
duralist and thus both non-moralizing and anti-paternalist. herefore, it
is not a problem that the analytical scope is narrow in this sense. On the
contrary, this narrowness counts in favor of the theory as a whole.
Justifying judgments of inauthenticity
Adding the delimiting clause to the dissenting self-reflection thesis
and to the combination of the two indicators of inauthenticity results
in the following:
(1) Here, judgments of inauthenticity only target desire-holders
who are known to carry a general wish to live according to the
prevailing social andmoral standards, and desires that are seri-
ously undesirable according to those standards.
(2) Judgments of inauthenticity are justiûed if there is suõcient
reason to believe that the desire-holder would disapprove of
having the desire upon informed and critical self-reection.
(3) here is reason to believe that a desire-holder would disap-
prove of having a desire to the extent that it is known to be due
to causal factors that are not normal to how the desire-holder is
otherwise construed, taking both physical andmental disposi-
tions into consideration, and to the extent that it is known to be
incoherent with how the desire-holder’s identity has developed
over time and is presently being sustained.
84
the inauthenticity judgments article
1 through 3 justiûes judgments of inauthenticity. In shorter terms, and
in light of the arguments above, the justiûcation may read:
For persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social
andmoral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable
according to those standards, it is justiûed to judge that a desire
is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that
are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the
person’s practical identity.
Concluding remarks
To conclude, it is not clear how the notion of authenticity should be un-
derstood, nor what its place is in the contemporary autonomy-oriented
bioethical paradigm. However, it is both common and reasonable to
treat the notion as concerning desires. As such, it is a problem to de-
termine what justiûes judgments of inauthenticity. A content-neutral
solution to that problem has been proposed building from the sanc-
tionist tradition (a starting point and a tradition which both require
elaborate and independent defenses).
I do not claim that my proposal is the only way to justify judgments
of inauthenticity. Instead, it should be understood as generally reason-
giving in a larger framework of reflective equilibrium, and applying it
requires substantial moral deliberation. For instance, very little has been
said about what it means that a desire is “seriously” deviating from a
person’s practical identity. Further guidance in that particular matter is
found in, e.g., Christman (2009, pp. 149–156). Likewise, 1 through 3 and
the summarized proposal are expressed in terms of degrees rather than in
necessary or sufficient conditions. herefore, it must always be amatter
of deliberation to determine, e.g., to which extent a desire is known
to be alien to the desire-holder. Further guidance in how to apply the
proposal in practicemay be found in themethodological discussions in
Beauchamp and Childress (2013) and Beauchamp and Rauprich (2016).
Furthermore, it must be noted that decisions are not autonomous
only because it is not justiûed to judge that the underlying desires are
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inauthentic. Although the desires must be treated as authentic, the
desire-holder may, e.g., be incapable of realizing and assessing the impli-
cations of the decision. In short, authentic decisions do not necessarily
amount to autonomous decisions.
I have here attempted to bridge the gap between theoretical ideals of
authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomed-
ical settings. Future contributions to authenticity theorymay determine
whether I have succeeded in that aim.
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A Non-Ideal Authenticity-Based Conceptualization
of Personal Autonomy
Abstract: Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics.
he concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the
non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress,
everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the
extent that they are intentional and aremade with understanding and
without controlling inuences. It is sometimes suggested that authentic-
ity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents
otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions.
Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, this article develops
a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy.
Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and
the full concept is defended from three expected objections. he the-
ory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists
and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of
anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the
theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of
patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable
action-guidance in practical contexts.
Keywords:Autonomy, authenticity, anorexianervosa,healthcare, bioethics
Introduction
Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. he con-
cept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under Beauchamp
and Childress’s non-ideal conceptualization, everyday choices of gen-
erally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are
intentional and aremadewith understanding andwithout controlling in-
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uences (2013, p. 104ò). It is sometimes suggested that authenticity, i.e.,
being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is important to per-
sonal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous
persons from making autonomous choices. Yet, while the notion has
previously been included in ideal conceptualizations of autonomy, there
have at least to my knowledge not been any attempts at incorporating
authenticity in a non-ideal conceptualization of personal autonomy.1
Elsewhere, I have proposed that judgments of inauthenticity in oth-
ers are justiûed under certain conditions (Ahlin 2018b). In this article,
I adjust those conditions for the present purposes and add them to
Beauchamp and Childress’s account of autonomy. he result is a non-
ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of autonomy supplemented
with relatively easy detected factors that indicate non-autonomous
decision-making.
he article is structured as follows. First, I account for and briey
discuss White’s recently proposed ideal account of authenticity-based
personal autonomy. his is followed by a more elaborate explication
of Beauchamp and Childress’s non-ideal account. In the subsequent
section, I introduce the conditions under which judgments of inauthen-
ticity are justiûed and add them to Beauchamp and Childress’s account
of autonomy to render a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization
of autonomy. Factors that indicate non-autonomous decision-making
are explicated, and three expected objections aremet. hen, I apply the
complete account to a case which has been thoroughly discussed in the
literature on authenticity, namely a patient who suòers from anorexia
nervosa and expresses potentially distressing wishes concerning her
own medical situation. A brief ûnal section concludes the discussion.
1One possible exception is Swanson, who argues that a non-ideal conceptualization of




Ideal accounts of authenticity-based autonomy
here aremany diòerent usages of the terms “ideal theory” and “non-
ideal theory” (Valentini 2012). Here, I intend “ideal theory” to designate
some model—in this case of autonomy and/or authenticity—that is
largely hypothetical. Few or no persons or decisions are ever fully au-
tonomous or authentic in this sense, as the conditions underwhich ideal
autonomy or authenticity obtains are perfect or conceptual. By “non-
ideal theory,” I intend accounts that are not constructed accordingly. he
approach is sometimes also known as “realist” or “problem-oriented,”
as it starts from actual people, facts, conditions, etc., in the real world
rather than in some theoretical model.
here are various theories aiming to explain authenticity, none of
which takes precedence over others (Ahlin 2018a; Noggle 2005). he
relevant problem in practical biomedical contexts is not to determine
what is authentic, but what is inauthentic. One example of when the
notion has been invoked in biomedical contexts is when patients suf-
fering from anorexia nervosa have said that they would rather die than
gain weight (Tan et al. 2006). he claim appears to be inauthentic and,
arguably, for that reason also non-autonomous (see, e.g., Sjöstrand and
Juth 2014). his is discussed at greater length in a below section.
In one of the most recent contributions to authenticity theory in
biomedical ethics,White (2018) argues in favor of using the notion of
authenticity as a frame of reference in assessments of the validity of
patients’ healthcare decisions. More speciûcally, it should be used in
accounts of autonomy as ameans to protect high-stake choices from
being overridden. White suggests that the notion of authenticity should
provide an underlying frame of reference that allows assessments of
whether a particular healthcare decision is adequately understood or
appreciated. he theory of authenticity whichWhite adopts is broadly
Lockean. In it, authenticity concerns the “self,” which should be under-
stood as a set of “enduring, stable overlapping psychological elements,
including values, beliefs and desires” (pp. 193–194). his entails that the
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validity of a patient’s healthcare decisions should be assessed in relation
to the historical construction of the patient’s self. A healthcare deci-
sion that conicts with the psychological elements that constitute the
patient’s “self” is inauthentic, and this inauthenticity should inuence
assessments mainly of the patient’s decision-making competence.
Other, less recent, similar ideal theories include Christman (2009)
and Juth (2005). Christman argues that “Autonomy involves competence
and authenticity; authenticity involves non-alienation upon (historically
sensitive, adequate) self-reection, given one’s diachronic practical iden-
tity and one’s position in the world” (2009, p. 155). Juth oòers this
minimalist deûnition of personal autonomy: “A person, in a situation, is
autonomous to the extent that she does what she decides to do, because
she decides to do it, and decides to do what she wants to do, because she
wants to do it” (2005, p. 137). He proceeds to argue that, in this analysis,
authenticity is one of three components of autonomy (the other two are
decision competence and eõciency) (ibid).
hese suggestions are ideal. White considers some of the practical
restrictions in healthcare contexts, such as the epistemic diõculties
of determining inauthenticity in others, but builds from a theoretical
model rather than from real patients in real contexts. I do not claim
that these constructs aremistaken or irrelevant, but I wish to propose
a non-ideal alternative to them. In contrast toWhite’s theory,my pro-
posal is to add the notion of authenticity to a set of conditions which
both together and separately indicate that a patient’s decision-making
is non-autonomous (in diòerent aspects). his furthers the theoretical
approach to autonomy theory which takes authenticity as one of the
basic conditions of autonomy, but diòers from previous contributions
in that it is non-ideal rather than ideal.
Beauchamp and Childress’s non-ideal account of autonomy
In their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2013), Beauchamp and
Childress propose a non-ideal conceptualization of autonomy. heir
account builds on the premise that everyday choices of generally com-
petent persons are autonomous (p. 104). Autonomous actions are then
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analyzed “in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2)
with understanding, and (3) without controlling inuences that deter-
mine their action” (ibid). Essentially, the current project is to add a
fourth condition to that analysis, namely authenticity. First however,
the conditions just mentionedmust be further elaborated.
he premise that everyday choices of generally competent persons
are autonomous includes standards of incompetence, i.e., conditions that
negate a person’s decision-making capabilities. Beauchamp and Childress
suggest seven types of related inabilities, including the inability to express
or communicate a choice, the inability tounderstandone’s situation and its
consequences, and the inability to understand relevant information (2013,
p. 118). hesemark a threshold level of decision-making competence, so
that persons who display one or more inabilities should be judged as less
competent or incompetent to make the decision in question.
he condition of intentional action is explicated through a contrast
with accidental action. Acting intentionally requires a plan, i.e., a “rep-
resentation of the series of events proposed for the execution of [the]
action” (p. 104). Accidental actions are not planned accordingly. In-
tentional actions “correspond to the actor’s conception of the act in
question,” whereas accidental actions do not (ibid).
he condition ofunderstandingmeans that an act isnon-autonomous
if the agent does not adequately understand it (ibid). Having an ade-
quate understanding is different from having a full understanding. For
illustration, consider the so-called “butterfly effect,” i.e., a common term
designating the fact that even small interventions in a system may have
significant effects on an aggregated scale. For instance, flicking a cigarette
butt in the dry woods is a small act that may lead to a huge wildfire and
thousands of people having to relocate. On Beauchamp and Childress’s
account, an agent is not required to have a full understanding of the “but-
terfly effect” of an act for it to be autonomous. It should not be said that
the person flicking the cigarette butt acted non-autonomously because
she did not know that the act would have those significant effects. Ade-
quate understanding, i.e., a reasonable estimation of the nature,meaning,
and outcome of the act in question, suffices for it to be autonomous.
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Instead of spelling out precisely what “adequate” understanding
means, Beauchamp and Childress mention factors that may limit under-
standing, such as “illness, irrationality, and immaturity” (ibid). When
the condition of understanding concerns a person’s informed consent to
treatment, Beauchamp and Childress list “the nature and purpose of the
intervention, alternatives, risks and beneûts, and recommendations” as
“typically [. . . ] essential” (p. 132). hus, having an adequate understand-
ing of an act involves awareness of relevant and reasonably foreseeable
facts that are central to the act in question. Most importantly, for an
act to be autonomous the agent must understand the basics of how it is
likely to aòect her own person and her way of life.
Finally, the third condition concerns acting without controlling
inuences (pp. 104–105). Controlling inuences may be external to the
agent, such aswhen she is coerced ormanipulated into performing some
act, or internal to her, such as when she is drunk or suòers from some
mental disorder. Obviously, human beings are almost always subjected
to some controlling inuence. hat comes with being a social animal. It
is natural to us to lead our lives aer the expectation of others, at least
to some extent, and our expectations of ourselves are certainly at least
partly socially constructed. It is likely that no human being has ever
been completely free from controlling inuences.
But, Beauchamp and Childress note that controlling inuences, un-
like the binary notion of intentional and unintentional actions, come
in degrees (p. 105). Inuences such as coercion andmanipulation are
controlling to a greater extent than, for instance, the social expectations
thatwomen should be beautiful andmen should be strong. Because they
aremore controlling, coercion andmanipulation have a greater eòect
on the autonomy withwhich an agent acts. Likewise, internal inuences
such as severe drug addiction may have a greater eòect on the auton-
omy of a person than, for instance, socially contingent self-constraints.
hus, considering only the third and ûnal condition in Beauchamp and
Childress’s account of autonomy, an act is autonomous to the extent that
it is free from controlling inuences.
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It should be noted that Beauchamp and Childress adhere to a theory
of justiûcation andmethodology that builds from John Rawls’s theory
of reective equilibrium (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, pp. 390–429).
On my understanding, they hold that a normative claim is justiûed to
the extent that it is coherent with other relevant claims in moral and fac-
tual matters, andwith our stable and considered intuitions regarding the
problem in question. Elsewhere, Beauchamp writes that their method
aims to produce “coherent strings of norms that connect basic princi-
ples, derivative norms, and context-speciûc judgments” (Beauchamp
and Rauprich 2016, p. 6). In what follows, my arguments should be
understood in light of this methodological approach. I return briey to
thesemethodological comments below in a discussion about so-called
“underdetermined” moral concepts.
Authenticity as a condition of autonomous choosing
Justifying judgments of inauthenticity
In my proposal, judgments of inauthenticity in others concern their
decision-making, or more precisely their desires, as desires are themost
basic element in ordinary preference-forming and, thus, in decision-
making. I follow Taylor (2005), Sjöstrand and Juth (2014), and others in
this desire-oriented approach. For reasons of justiûcation, judgments of
inauthenticity are delimited to concern only a certain kind of persons,
namely those whose medical condition may inuence their decision-
making so that they hurt themselves or others. Examples of such persons
include an anorexia nervosa patient who expresses a wish to die rather
than gain weight and someone with a brain tumor that causes him or
her to develop pedophilic sexual desires.2 For those persons and the
desires underlying their healthcare decisions, I argue that it is justiûed
to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal
2he examplewith the pedophilic desires is not hypothetical; this happened to an otherwise
normally functioning adult man. See Burns and Swerdlow (2003) and the below.
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factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from
the person’s practical identity.3
hus, there are three main elements in my proposal that require
some elaboration here; the kind of people and desires included in the
analysis, the notion of alien causal factors, and the notion of deviation.
For pedagogical reasons, I will go through them in the opposite order.
However, ûrst I present some brief notes on the theoretical foundation
ofmy proposal.
In one tradition, the distinguishing feature between authentic and
inauthentic desires is whether the desire-holder would endorse her
own desires upon critical and informed self-reection. he tradition is
known mainly from Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin (1988) and has been
supportedmore recently by Juth (2005) and DeGrazia (2005), among
others. It has been noted that the distinguishing feature is diõcult to
observe in others (see, e.g., Ahlin 2018a; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014; and;
Swindell 2009). hat is, it is diõcult to know whether a person would
endorse her own desires upon informed and critical self-reection, and
therefore the theoretical ideal is impractical, at best. However, the
distinguishing feature can be reversed, so that a desire is inauthentic
if the desire-holder would disapprove of having it upon critical and
informed self-reection (cf. Juth 2005, p. 153). hen, it is less diõcult to
observe inauthenticity in others, as empirical factors that indicate that
a desire-holder would in fact disapprove accordingly can be identiûed
and articulated in detail. he theory which is presently being spelled
out builds on this reversed version of the Frankfurt–Dworkean ideal.
he notions of alien causal factors and of deviation are empirical factors
indicating that a desire-holderwould disapprove of having a desire upon
critical and informed self-reection.
hat is the theoretical foundation of my proposal. It is an ideal
theory of what distinguishes authenticity from inauthenticity. What
3his proposal builds on Ahlin (2018b) but includes other kinds of persons and desires.
In Ahlin (2018b), persons that are known to wish to adhere to the prevailing social and
moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards




follows here, however, does not concern that distinction per se, but
the justiûcation of judgments of inauthenticity, i.e., what justiûes the
judgment that a desiremeets the conditions for being inauthentic. hat
justiûcation is phrased in non-ideal terms, and builds from empirical
factors in real persons and contexts.
Consider a person who suddenly displays a desire that is seriously de-
viating from her practical identity, i.e., theway she usually thinks, behaves,
and functions socially (cf. Christman 2009, pp. 149–156). One hypotheti-
cal example is Anna, a professional ballet dancer known to love dancing
more than anything else, who after being injured refuses to undergo a
minor treatment that would enable her to continue dancing (Ahlin 2018a,
p. 44). Her refusal builds on desires that are seriously deviating from
her practical identity. herefore, the case invites the thought that Anna’s
desires are inauthentic. However, the judgment is not justified. he rea-
sons for why Annamakes the surprising decision to refuse treatment is
unknown. Because we do not know the causal history of her desires, we
are not justified in making the judgment that they are inauthentic.
Now, consider a 40-year oldman who suddenly developed a sexual
interest in children that was causally connected to a brain tumor (Burns
and Swerdlow 2003). When the tumor was removed the pedophilic
symptoms disappeared, and when the symptoms later returned it was
found that the brain tumor had grown back. here is no doubt that the
tumor caused theman’s sexual interests. hus, the causal factors of the
man’s desires were alien to how he was otherwise construed, which intu-
itively seems to justify the judgment that they are inauthentic. However,
alien causal factors do not suffice to justify that judgment. For instance,
sometimes alien empirical factors cause non-alien desires, such as the
hypothetical case of a sugar addict who develops a brain tumor causing
cravings for sweets. herefore, it is not justified to make the judgment
that an alien desire is inauthenticmerely because of its causal history.
he two notions seem to do well when combined, so that desires
that are both deviating from the desire-holder’s practical identity and are
due to alien causes indicate inauthenticity. However, there is onemajor
flaw in the suggestion that the combination would justify judgments of
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inauthenticity. Consider a person who displays a deviating and alien
desire which is good, in some sense. For instance, in one case, a 90-year
old woman who was otherwise quiet and shy suddenly started to make
jokes and flirtwith youngmen (Sacks 1985, chap. 11). Her “frisky behavior”
was found to be due to untreated syphilis, i.e., an alien cause of deviating
desires. But, the woman enjoyed her new self and did not want it to go
away. It appears to be unjustified to judge that her desires are inauthentic,
in spite of the fact that they are both deviating and due to alien causes.4
herefore, in my proposal, judgments of inauthenticity should be de-
limited to personswhosemedical conditionmay inuence theirdecision-
making so that they hurt themselves or others. hen, it is justiûed to
make the judgment that, for instance, the 40-year oldman who devel-
oped a sexual interest in children had inauthentic desires while it is
not justiûed to make the judgment that the 90-year old woman who
developed a new way of life had inauthentic desires.
hus, to summarizemy proposal:
Forpersonswhosemedical conditionmay influence theirdecision-
making so that they hurt themselves or others, it is justified to
judge that an underlying desire is inauthentic to the extent that
it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the
extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity.
In the next subsection, Iwill incorporate it inBeauchamp andChildress’s
account of personal autonomy.
A non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of autonomy
he basic premise in the theory is that everyday choices of generally compe-
tent persons are autonomous. Call such persons “normal.” A second basic
premise is now added: choices made by otherwise normal personswho
suffer from somemedical condition that may influence their decisions so
that they hurt themselves or others are sometimes inauthentic.
4It may also be noted that desires can be inauthentic although the available empirical
evidence does not suõce for observers to be justiûed in making that judgment.
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hus, the theory has two basic premises with diòerent functions.
he ûrst premise is directly connected to the autonomy of persons; a
person who is not generally competent according to the standards of
incompetence elaborated on above is less autonomous than a person
who is generally competent. However, a person who suòers from some
medical condition of the kind discussed here is not necessarily less
autonomous than one who does not suòer from such conditions; for
instance, themedical condition may not actually inuence her decisions
merely because it can potentially do so. hus, the second premise is only
indirectly connected to the autonomy of persons; it enables judgments
of inauthenticity through conditions that will be spelled out shortly.
he fourth condition of authenticitymaynowbe added toBeauchamp
and Childress’s list, for stylistic reasons between the first and second con-
dition. hus, autonomous choice can be analyzed in terms of normal
persons who act (1) intentionally, (2) from authentic desires, (3) with
understanding, and (4) without controlling influences that determine
their action. Each condition is assumed to apply until there is reason
to believe otherwise. hat is, normal persons are assumed to act, e.g.,
intentionally or with understanding unless something indicates the op-
posite. It remains here to spell out in practically usable terms factors that
indicate that an otherwise normal person acts from inauthentic desires.
Two factors indicate inauthenticity. Bothmust be present for a judgment
of inauthenticity to be justified. In practically useful terms, they read:
he factor of deviation It is a factor indicating inauthenticity
that the desire under scrutiny does not cohere with how the
desire-holder’s identity has developed over time and is presently
being sustained.
he factor of alien causes It is a factor indicating inauthenticity
that the desire under scrutiny is due to causes that are not normal
to how the desire-holder is otherwise construed, taking both
physical andmental dispositions into consideration.
99
authenticity in bioethics
It should be noted that the factors come in degrees and are sensitive to
judgment. For instance, a desiremay deviate from a person’s practical
identity, but only insignificantly. To illustrate, Anna, the hypothetical
professional ballet dancer,may have a desire to drink beer on the evening
before an important show. he desire conflicts with her desires to stay
focused and do everything that is in her power to perform well on the
show, although the deviation from Anna’s desire-set is not significant
enough to indicate inauthenticity. hat is, Annamay have the authentic
desire to drink beer on the evening before an important show. Deviations
should bemore serious than that to merit the judgment that a desire is
inauthentic. Had Anna instead had the desire to try heroin, the judgment
may have been different due to the seriousness of the deviation.
Furthermore, as explained above, in this framework judgments of
inauthenticity are only justiûed regarding a certain kind of persons.
herefore, justiûcation of such judgments requires knowledge of the
person’s medical condition and substantive deliberation on whether the
personmay hurt themselves or others. hus, judgments of inauthenticity
are amatter of practical and context-sensitive deliberation in particular
cases. hereby, the present proposal—as Beauchamp and Childress’s
original account of autonomy—is conceptually underdetermined. It
is a structure for rational deliberation on the authenticity of decisions
made by otherwise normal persons, but it does not include complete
speciûcations of how the involved concepts apply in particular cases and
contexts. As such, the proposal should be understood not in terms of,
e.g., necessary and suõcient conditions, but as generally reason-giving
in a framework of reective equilibrium.5
Objections
In this subsection, I respond to three (internally independent) objections
to my proposal; the threshold for making a judgment of inauthenticity
appears to be too high, the condition of authenticity brings normative
5For amore in-depth discussion of how underdeterminedmoral concepts should be applied
in practical contexts, see Beauchamp and Rauprich (2016).
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content into an otherwise value-neutral conceptualization of autonomy,
and, ûnally,my suggested addition to Beauchamp and Childress’s con-
cept of autonomy is superuous.
Because both factors that indicate inauthenticitymust bemet for a
judgmentof inauthenticity tobe justified, it appears that few actionswould
ever be judged as inauthentic. his is not a bad thing; the conceptualiza-
tion of autonomy which is defended here is ultimately anti-paternalist.
From an anti-paternalist perspective, it is good that most actions are
treated as autonomous and that factors that indicate the opposite are few.
What is important is instead that the conceptualization is accurate.
Furthermore, the factors do in fact support judgments of inauthen-
ticity in real cases (see the next section). Consider, for instance, patients
suffering from borderline personality disorder (BPD). Some BPD pa-
tients are characterized by unstable “selves” andmay, for instance, display
sudden and dramatic shifts in goals, values, vocational aspirations, types
of friends, and so on (Lester 2009). In generic cases, both factors indicat-
ing inauthenticity are thus present; BPD patients are otherwise normal
personswith seriously deviating desires that are due to alien causes. heir
actions and healthcare decisions are non-autonomous, and the present
non-ideal conceptualization of autonomy enables the reliable judgment
that they are non-autonomous for authenticity-related reasons.
Proceeding with the second objection, it is true that the condition
of authenticity brings normative content into the conceptualization of
autonomy through the second basic premise, i.e., that choices made by
otherwise normal persons who suòer from somemedical condition that
may inuence their decisions so that they hurt themselves or others are
sometimes inauthentic. But, the concept was never value-neutral. Most
importantly, Beauchamp and Childress’s standards of incompetence are
value-laden (2013, pp. 114–20). To paraphrase Buchanan and Brock, the
proper standard of incompetencemust be chosen; it cannot be discov-
ered (1990, p. 47). Choosing such standards involves moral assessment
and deliberation. hus, any judgement that a person is incompetent to
make a certain healthcare decision is moralizing, because the standards
of incompetence aremorally loaded.
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Finally, the thirdobjection is thatmy suggested addition toBeauchamp
and Childress’ concept of autonomy is superfluous; their concept already
accounts for concerns of inauthenticity through the condition of con-
trolling influences.6 As explained above, Beauchamp and Childress ana-
lyze autonomous actions in terms of normal choosers who act “without
controlling influences that determine their action” (2013, p. 104). Some
controlling influences are internal to the agent, such as, e.g., psychiatric
disorders and drug addiction (p. 138). herefore, the argument goes, asmy
suggestion builds on the notion of alien causal factors—understood as in-
ternally controlling influences—it adds nothing substantial toBeauchamp
and Childress’s concept.
However, although theymention the possibility of internally control-
ling inuences, Beauchamp and Childress do not focus on them in their
conceptualization of autonomy (pp. 104–105, 138). In fact, internally
controlling inuences are almost completely le out of the discussion
of the condition of non-control. hus, I seemy suggested addition as
a contribution to Beauchamp and Childress’s concept as it explicates
one kind of internally controlling inuence. It enables analysis in one
instance of non-control that was previously theoretically underdevel-
oped. Furthermore, the addition suggests that this kind of internally
controlling inuence should be understood in terms of authenticity
speciûcally, and not in other terms. hereby, the addition also connects
one kind of internally controlling inuences to an already established
theoretical school of thought, namely the Frankfurt–Dworkean.
hus, the three objections that the threshold for making a judgment
of inauthenticity is too high, that the condition of authenticity brings
normative content into an otherwise value-neutral concept, and that
my suggested addition is superuous do not overthrowmy proposed
authenticity-based conceptualization of autonomy.





A non-ideal account of autonomy is good only insofar as it provides
real normative guidance in practical contexts. herefore, in this section,
I apply the account in an analysis of a healthcare decision made by a
person suòering from anorexia nervosa. he person declinedmedical
treatment. he test consists in analyzing whether the desires underlying
that decision were inauthentic.
Because of its non-ideal nature, it does not suõce to test the theory
on a generic case-description of anorexia nervosa; real testing requires
a real case. However, there are no in-depth individual case-descriptions
focusing on anorexia nervosa in the bioethical literature on authenticity.
herefore, I have here constructed a hypothetical case building from
two interview studies conductedwith anorexia nervosa patients, namely
Hope et al. (2011) andTan et al. (2006). he studies have been inuential
in the bioethical debate on authenticity and are generally considered to
be authoritative in this context. he citations below are real but come
from diòerent patients in the studies. hey are here represented by the
hypothetical person “Amy.”
he case-type is chosen because anorexia nervosa is commonly used
as a paradigm example of the complexities involved with inauthenticity
judgments. he aim when designing the case-token has been to reect
the diõculties of authenticity-related moral problems that are some-
times a reality in healthcare settings. Although the case is purposefully
designed for a speciûc theoretical cause, it is realistic. he realism is
central for the present purposes, which is why the case is not designed
through mere speculation but is based on empirical studies. To the best
ofmy understanding, “Amy” is a truthful representation of real persons
who have been diagnosed with anorexia nervosa.
The hypothetical Amy
Amy is 25 years old. She has been diagnosed with anorexia nervosa but
is now recovered. Two years ago, Amy had a body mass index (BMI)
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of 17. She then visited a psychiatrist regularly but did not want any
physical treatment or medication related to her anorexia. he interview
with Amy includes questions which are pertinent to her authenticity
and identity, to her decisions and decision-making capacity, and to her
values and self-appreciation.
Here, she describes her disorder as separate from her real self (Hope
et al. 2011, p. 22):
(1) It IS like another voice, it is like another, it’s almost like having
two bits of you that are you all the time. he bit of you that is
really scared of food and everything that means and the rest of
you that wants to be able to get on without it. I just feel like
there’s two voices in my head sometimes.
(2) So I didn’t really want treatment, but then there’s this little
voice deep down inside, which is kind of the complex part, that’s
saying “you know you do want treatment really,” but then there’s
this kind of overriding big THING which is just like “no, you’re
FAT” (laughs), “you don’t need to put on weight!”
Here, Amy describes how her disorder influenced her personality (ibid,
p. 23):
(3) I feel like it’s [the anorexia nervosa]mademe ameaner person
than I was before, [. . . ] it’s really weird because at some times I
can be, like, themost seless person [. . . ] and other times I can
be completely selûsh.
And, here she describes how her desires are conicting (ibid, p. 24):
(4) But at themoment it’s really hard, I want to eat the normal
amounts, but it’s really hard because at themoment, if I did eat
the normal amounts I know that I wouldn’t feel happy about it.
But I want to be able to.
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Here, she describes her anorexia as part of her identity (ibid, p. 25):
(5) Once you’ve taken that [the anorexia nervosa] away, you’ve
taken away part of my identity, so I’m bound to feel a bit lost.
[. . . ] It’s like you’re trying to take away the something that is a
huge part ofmy life, [. . . ] and if that goes what am I le with?
Here, Amy describes a diõculty to apply a factual belief to her own
situation (Tan et al. 2006 p. 271):
(6) here’s part of me that didn’t believe it [risk of death], but
then I did feel very ill. [. . . ] Because I didn’t get to an incredibly,
incredibly low weight, I wasn’t in hospital, so in which case, I
thought, “ok,maybe half a stone down the line thatwould be very,
very true but at themoment I don’t think it’s going to happen.”
But also at that point it was a very focused and not very happy
life so to be honest I also didn’t care.7
his is how Amy answers a question on how important her weight and
body size is to her (ibid, p. 274):
(7) I suppose if I were answering the question for anyone else
I would probably say it was of no importance, because all my
friends are of diòerent sizes and it doesn’t make any diòerence,
but just for me it’s diòerent, I feel like I suppose because I got so
caught up in it that it is really important, but I don’t know why,
but it is; I feel really guilty ofmyself, putting weight on it puts
on it makes me feel really diòerent.
To summarize, Amy reports of conicting identities and desires. She
explains how the disorder had an inuence on her personality, her
capability to appreciate the nature of her situation, and on her values and
self-appreciation. Now, the analytical task is to make reliable judgments
of inauthenticity. WhenAmy was in this condition she declinedmedical
treatment. Was that decision based on inauthentic desires?




Amy’s case is complex. She is an adult and under normal circumstances
thus both legally andmorally entitled to make her own healthcare deci-
sions. Yet, it is clear that there are serious autonomy-related problems
involved with her case. It is of interest whether Amy’s healthcare de-
cisions should have been overridden in concern for her well-being. It
should be recognized that the outcome of Amy’s case is already known;
she is now recovered. his may inuence our intuitions. But, the ana-
lytical task concerns decisions that Amymade while she was ill, so the
outcomemust be set aside.
he analysis must beginwith answering towhat kind of personAmy
is andwhat kind of desires it is that it subject to critical scrutiny. With the
theory that is presently being spelled out, it is crucial thatAmy’s medical
condition was such that it could have inuenced her decision-making
so that she hurt herself or others, and that her healthcare decision was
high-stake accordingly. his was true in Amy’s case, which is reected
in the diagnostic criteria of anorexia nervosa (American Psychiatric
Association 2013) and in citations 6 and 7.
To proceed, the substantive analysis of the desires under scrutiny
concerns whether they are due to causal factors that are alien to Amy
and whether they deviate from her practical identity.
Clearly, anorexia nervosa is onemajor causal factor. It is a disorder
and as such it is alien to how Amy is otherwise construed, taking both
physical andmental dispositions into consideration. It is at least partly
because of alien causes that Amy declinedmedical treatment. To some
extent, the causal history of Amy’s desires indicate that they are inau-
thentic, i.e., that she would disapprove of having them upon critical and
informed self-reection.
It is less clear that the underlying desires are incoherent with Amy’s
practical identity, that is, how her identity has developed over time
and was sustained at the time that shemade her healthcare decisions.
In citations 1 and 2, she reports of a duality of her personhood, but
the descriptions are vague and do not support anything conclusive
regarding her practical identity. But, in citation 3 she expresses the view
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that the disorder had inuenced her personality in a way that she did
not appreciate. hus, when she was ill, she held at least some desires
that deviated from her practical identity. And, in citation 4 Amy says
that there is a “normal” amount of food, here interpreted as normal to
her, and that it was hard for her to eat so much. his report implies not
only that she held desires that were internally conicting, but also that
they conicted with who she really was. In light of these observations,
Amy’s desire to declinemedical treatment appear to be deviating and,
thus, possibly inauthentic. However, the analysis is not complete yet.
In citation 5, Amy explicitly states that anorexia nervosa is part of her,
meaning that the disorder and its influences are not deviating from her
practical identity. And, in citation 7, she reports that her weight and body
size is very important to her. hese values may be due to her anorexia
nervosa, but it may also be the case that her anorexia nervosa is due to
Amy having these values. In light of these observations, Amy’s desire to
declinemedical treatment instead appear to be coherentwith her practical
identity. Or, it is at least not obvious that the desire is incoherent.
hus, Amy’s desires are partly conicting with how her identity has
developed over time and was sustained at the time that shemade her
healthcare decisions. To some limited extent, this conict indicates that
the desires are inauthentic, i.e., that Amy would disapprove of having
them upon critical and informed self-reection. However, Amy’s claims
that the disorder is part of her and that her weight and body size is very
important to her indicate the opposite, i.e., that the underlying desires of
Amy’s healthcare decision are in fact authentic. hese contradictory indi-
cators should give rise to further investigation and follow-up questions.
his is unfortunately impossible in the present case, as there is no more
information available. herefore, although there is some limited evi-
dence supporting the judgment that Amy’s desires are inauthentic, the
factors from deviation which are available for analysis are inconclusive.
In conclusion, both factors of alien causes and of deviation are
present in the case of Amy. However, because of the epistemic un-
certainty involved, which are due to contradictory evidence, it is only
justiûed to some limited extent to judge that the desires underlying
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her decision to decline medical treatment are inauthentic and, thus,
non-autonomous to some degree.8
Evaluating the test
he ûrst thing to be noted is that the analysis is fruitful even though
the case is complex, vague, and contains little detailed information.
he central authenticity-relatedmoral problems are clearly articulated
with solid theoretical support. Both factors that indicate inauthenticity
and factors that indicate the opposite are explicated in detail, which
enables critical scrutiny. Also, the results appear to be generally reason-
giving in a framework of reective equilibrium. hat is, to some limited
extent, the analysis supports the judgment that Amy’s decision was non-
autonomous for authenticity-related reasons. he theory is successful
in these respects,mainly because it provides a conceptual framework
that enables detailed analysis.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the theory could
be even more fruitful in future analyses of similar cases, as it provides
theoretical support for focusing on a certain kind of behavior in patients
and for asking them certain kinds of questions. It provides a reliable
framework for analyses of personal autonomy in terms of authenticity.
Concluding remarks
In this article, the Frankfurt–Dworkean tradition of thinking about au-
thenticity has been merged with Beauchamp and Childress’s non-ideal
account of autonomy. he result is a non-ideal authenticity-based account
of autonomy that, when applied, seems to be fruitful in analyses of the
degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making in healthcare. hereby,
the theory succeeds in providing reliable and practical action-guidance in
amatter which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time.
8Citation 6 reects that Amy’s decision may have been non-autonomous to some extent
also in the sense that she had limited decision-making capabilities, but it is beyond the
present purposes to elaborate on this observation.
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Because it provides reliable action-guidance, the theory may be
foundational for paternalist considerations of coercive care. However,
such considerations must include normative support concerning the
suõcient degree of epistemic certainty of inauthenticity and the justiûed
proportionality of the intervention, among other things. hus, although
the present theorymay be foundational for paternalist interventions in
the name of authenticity, it does not by itself provide suõcient moral
support for coercive care.
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Nine Cases of Possible Inauthenticity in Biomedical Contexts
and What They Require from Bioethicists
Abstract: Respect for autonomy is amain moral principle in bioethics.
It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,”
“true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. his article
collects nine cases in which the notion of authenticity has been or could
be invoked in biomedical contexts. One recently developed theory aim-
ing to provide normative guidance with regard to authenticity-related
problems is applied when it is possible, while it is explained in detail
why the theory is inept or impractical in the remaining cases. he article
thus provides an overview of authenticity-related problems which may
be helpful for autonomy theorists. Furthermore, it is argued that there
is no universal problem of authenticity, but many problems, and that
theymay require various particular solutions rather than one universal
solution. Among other things, it is suggested that bioethicists should
explore non-ideal methodological approaches to authenticity-related
problems to provide action-guidance with regard to them.
Keywords: Authenticity, autonomy, healthcare, bioethics
Introduction
“Iwasn’t really bothered about dying, as long as I died thin.” he citation
is an excerpt from an interview conducted with a person who talks
about her anorexia nervosa (Tan et al. 2006, p. 274). he person reports
that being thin was more important to her than being alive. Is her
wish authentic? Is it really hers, in a substantive sense? he question
has engaged bioethicists andmedical practitioners, partly because the
answer to it may also be important to another question, namely whether
the person’s healthcare decisions should have been respected.
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his article collects nine real and hypothetical cases inwhich bioethi-
cists andmedical practitioners have found the notion of authenticity
morally relevant in judgments of patients’ decision-making, or could
reasonably be expected to ûnd the notion relevant accordingly. It is
argued that there aremany diòerent authenticity-related problems that
require diòerent approaches, and that no theory of authenticity that
is present in the contemporary bioethical literature is capable of pro-
viding universal guidance with regards to all of those problems. he
article begins with an introduction to authenticity theory and its role
in biomedicine. he section also introduces a recently developed the-
ory aiming to provide normative guidance with regard to authenticity-
related problems, namely Ahlin Marceta (2018). In the subsequent
section, nine authenticity-related problems are accounted for, including
comments about what is required from authenticity theorists to solve
them. A brief ûnal section concludes.
Authenticity in biomedicine
The moral concern
To be autonomous is to be self-governed (Christman 2015). Respect for
autonomy is one of themainmoral principles in contemporary bioethics
(cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2013). In concern for patients’ autonomy,
bioethicists invoke concepts such as decision-making capacity (Grisso
et al. 1997) and voluntariness (Nelson et al. 2011). hat is, if a patient
is not capable ofmaking healthcare decisions, or if she is not making
healthcare decisionswhich are independent from undue inuences such
as social or economic pressures, this has a negative eòect on the degree
of autonomy of her healthcare decisions.
During the 20th century, informed consent practices have been
incorporated in healthcare in large parts of the Western world with
the aim of respecting and promoting patient autonomy (Jonsen 2000;
Faden and Beauchamp 1986). In recent years, various bioethicists have
raised the possibility of incorporating authenticity in autonomy-based
practices in healthcare (Ahlin Marceta 2018; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014;
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White 2018). It is not entirely clear how the notion of authenticity should
be conceptualized, although the term is usually understood to mean
“genuine,” “real,” “true to oneself,” or similar.
he bioethicists’ concern has been that healthcare decisions must be
authentic to be fully autonomous. Among the problems associated with
this concern is that authenticity is diõcult to detect in others (Ahlin
2018a; Sjöstrand and Juth 2014). More speciûcally, it is diõcult to jus-
tify the judgment that someone else’s person or decision is inauthentic
(Ahlin 2018b). Furthermore, although theremay be one true concep-
tion of authenticity, it is likely that real authenticity-related problems
require diòerent kinds of solutions. hus, bioethics may not need one
universal theory of authenticity but various theories that explain and
solve diòerent authenticity-related problems.
he present article supports that view. Here, nine authenticity-
related problems are explicated as they have been (or could reasonably
be) treated by bioethicists andmedical practitioners. It is argued that
there is no universal problem of authenticity, but many problems,
that they must be framed differently and, thus, solved differently. It
is concluded that bioethicists have reason to engage in authenticity-
related problems with aims and approaches that are specific for the
particular problem at hand, and explore the possibility of taking a new
non-ideal methodological grip on them.
Theories explaining authenticity
he perhaps most prominent tradition of thinking about authenticity
has its roots in a series of books and articles from the 1970’s and 1980’s, of
which Frankfurt (1971) andDworkin (1988) may be themost noteworthy.
In this tradition an act, decision, or desire is authentic if the agent
endorses it on a higher level of reection. For illustration, consider a
drug addict who has two conicting wishes on two diòerent levels of
desire. On one desire-level, she wants to shoot heroin. On a higher
desire-level, she wants to lead a long and healthy life. he desires are
conicting, and because of that conict the desire on the lower level is
deemed inauthentic. One criticism of so-called split-level theories of
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authenticity is that desires on the higher level must also be endorsed on
a yet higher level to be authentic, and desires on that level must also be
endorsed on a yet higher level, and so on in an inûnite regress (cf. Taylor
2005). If the critics are right, there is something inherently problematic
with the kind of authenticity theories which have gainedmost attention
from philosophers and bioethicists in recent decades.
Other theories of authenticity include, for instance, such that put
weight on the causal history of desires and such that focus on the co-
herence of full desire-sets. Elster’s theory is one example of the former.
In it, desires are inauthentic if they are “shaped by irrelevant causal
factors, by a blind psychic causality operating “behind the back’ of the
person” (Elster 1983, p. 16). In this line of thought authentic desires have
a certain kind of origin,most oen in some cognitive processes of the
desire-holder (Ahlin 2018, p. 46). One example of a coherence-oriented
theory is found in Miller, who writes that authentic actions are “con-
sistent with the person’s attitudes, values, dispositions, and life plans”
(Miller 1981, p. 24). In this line of thought actions, decisions, or desires
are instead authentic if they are coherent with the desire-holder’s full
set of desires (Ahlin 2018, pp. 46–7).
However, these theories are all oriented around decision-making or
acting. Bauer (2017) offers an alternative approach, namely the focus on
what it is to be an authentic person. he ideal of being an authentic person,
in Bauer’s proposal, is a combination of the ideal of expressing and un-
folding one’s individual personality and the ideal of being an autonomous
person who is morally responsible (p. 579). In more elaborate terms, the
ideal is comprised of (1) aspects of being authentic by being a selfwith dis-
tinctive characteristics of an individual personality. hese aspects include
the free unfolding of one’s individual personality, expression of oneself in
acting and living, and being true to one’s own convictions, beliefs, ideals,
life-plans, and projects (ibid). Furthermore, the ideal is comprised of (2)
aspects of being authentic by being “a person” in terms of an autonomous
(moral) agent. hese aspects include giving reasons and taking moral re-
sponsibility for one’s actions, being a reflective “self-evaluator,” and being
a trustworthy partner of social interaction (ibid).
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One other alternative is to focus instead on what it is to lead an au-
thentic life (cf. Taylor 1991). However, these alternative approaches have
not gained as much attention from bioethicists as the desire-oriented
approach, perhaps because bioethicists’ main focus is on autonomous
decision-making. It will be shown below that some authenticity-related
problems are diõcult to phrase in terms of decision-making, while
others are diõcult to not phrase in such terms.
A recently developed normative theory of (in-)authenticity judgments
In Ahlin Marceta (2018), I suggest a desire-oriented theory aiming to
provide guidance in practical authenticity-related problems. According
to the theory, the relevant problem is to justify judgments that someone’s
healthcare decision builds from inauthentic desires.1 For reasons of jus-
tification, the theory is delimited to concern “persons whosemedical
condition may influence their decision-making so that they hurt them-
selves or others.” For such persons, and their possibly harmful healthcare
decisions, “it is justified to judge that an underlying desire is inauthentic
to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person
and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity.”
In this theory, two factors must be present for a judgment of inau-
thenticity to be justiûed:
he factor of deviation It is a factor indicating inauthenticity
that the desire under scrutiny does not cohere with how the
desire-holder’s identity has developed over time and is presently
being sustained.
he factor of alien causes It is a factor indicating inauthenticity
that the desire under scrutiny is due to causes that are not normal
to how the desire-holder is otherwise construed, taking both
physical andmental dispositions into consideration.
Both factors are expressed in degrees rather than in necessary and suõ-
cient conditions, and are sensitive to judgment. It is, for instance, not
1he article is published as pre-print and lacks page numbers.
117
authenticity in bioethics
stated a priori what it means for a cause to be “not normal” to how the
desire-holder is otherwise construed. he theory requires practical and
context-sensitive deliberation in particular cases.
Its application is a two-step process. First, it must be determined
whether the person whose healthcare decisions are evaluated suòers
from a medical condition that may inuence their decision-making
so that they are harmful to themselves or others. Second, it must be
determinedwhether the two factors are present, and if so, towhat extent.
In Ahlin Marceta (2018), the process is demonstrated on a hypothetical
(but empirically grounded) case of anorexia nervosa.
In the below section, it is argued that the theory can be fruitfully
applied in three of the authenticity-related cases discussed (case 1, 2,
and 9), but that it is inept in the six remaining cases.
Nine authenticity-related cases
Overview
he cases are (1) inauthenticity from physical causes, (2) inauthenticity
from psychological causes, (3) unstable desire-sets, (4) lack of desires, (5)
medically induced authenticity, (6) inauthentic recovery, (7) indoctrinated
desires, (8) false selves, and (9) unexplained surprising desires. Cases 1
through 5 build on actual cases while cases 6 through 9 are hypothetical.
Case 1: Inauthenticity from physical causes
In a case study, Burns and Swerdlow (2003) report of an otherwise
normal 40-year oldman who suddenly developed a sexual interest in
children. heman had no previous pedophilic symptoms, and did not
want to have them either; among other things, he underwent a 12-step
program for sexual addiction to be able to lead a normal life. Upon
medical examination, it was found that theman’s sexual desires were
due to a brain tumor. He had developed a right orbitofrontal tumor
which aòected him cognitively and behaviorally. When the tumor was
removed, the pedophilic symptoms disappeared. When the symptoms
later returned, it was found that that the tumor had done so too. hus,
118
the nine cases article
there is a clear and unambiguous causal relationship between theman’s
brain tumor and his sexual desires. here seems to be authenticity-
related problems connected to the case.
One way to phrase one such problem is that theman’s sexual desires
do not seem to be authentic. Another phrasing is that theman does not
seem to be an authentic pedophile. It is not immediately clear whether
the two phrasings are substantially diòerent. A theory of authenticity
that is oriented around decision-making would support the former
phrasing, while a theory that is oriented around personhood would
support the latter.
If the problem is understood as concerning decision-making, the
theory from Ahlin Marceta (2018) can be fruitfully applied to it. First,
theman’s medical condition could have influenced his decision-making
negatively in the sense described by the theory. his is obvious from the
case description. Second, both the factor of deviation and the factor of
alien causes are present. he generic case description above does not
state to what extent they are present. However, that is not required for
the present purpose, which is to consider whether the theory can be
fruitfully applied to cases of authenticity from physical causes. It should
be reasonably clear from this brief discussion that the theory is applicable
in such cases, although its full potential can only be realized in more
detailed particular instances.
Case 2: Inauthenticity from psychological causes
Anorexia nervosa is usually treated as a psychiatric disorder. However, it
should be noted that patients suòering from it can be fully competent to
make healthcare decisions. Many can understand information relevant
to their condition and the recommended treatment, reason about the
potential risks and beneûts of their choices, appreciate the nature of their
situation and the consequences of their choices, and so on. Yet, they
assess their own bodies, i.e.,mainly theirweight and physical appearance,
unreasonably. Consider this excerpt from an interview conducted with
an anorexia nervosa patient. It is representative also of other interviews
in the same article (Tan et al. 2006, p. 274):
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Interviewer: What is the importance of your weight and body
size to you? “I just want to be thin.” Interviewer: How important
is that to you? “Very.” Interviewer:Why? “It just is, it’s all I want.”
hus, some anorexia nervosa patients have wishes that appear to be
defective in some way, not as amatter of incompetence but of values. It
is a problem to determine on what grounds these wishes are defective,
and one suggestion is that it is because they are inauthentic.
Many would make the intuitively valid claim that the patient has
inauthentic wishes because she has anorexia nervosa. However, inau-
thenticity is not listed among the diagnostic criteria for the disorder (see,
e.g., American Psychiatric Association 2013). herefore, although the
patient’s wishes may be inauthentic, it is not because she has anorexia
nervosa but for some reason external to the disorder. he intuitively
valid claim that the patient’swishes are inauthentic because she is anorec-
tic is thus not empirically or conceptually valid. It could reasonably be
argued that inauthenticity should be among the diagnostic criteria of
anorexia nervosa, although it then remains to explain precisely what it
is for something or someone to be inauthentic.
It may also be argued that our intuitions are misguided or misin-
terpreted in this case. hey are not intuitions about the possible inau-
thenticity of the patient’s wishes, but about the patient’s welfare. hat is,
the intuition is in fact that the patient’s wishes are defective because it
is not good to have them. Obviously, this can be true for some readers.
Yet, various clinicians and bioethicists, such as, e.g.,Hope et al. (2011),
Sjöstrand and Juth (2014), and Tan et al. (2006), have expressed and
analyzed the possible problem of anorexia nervosa patients’ wishes in
terms of authenticity. heir analyses do not appear to rest on misguided
or misinterpreted intuitions, but on the considered view that there is
some authenticity-related problem with such wishes.
he target case inAhlinMarceta (2018) is precisely a case of anorexia
nervosa, and I will not repeat the analysis here. It should be suõcient to
declare that the theory is (arguably) fruitful also in cases where there
appears to be problems connected to wishes that are intertwined with
the diagnostic criteria of some disorder.
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Case 3: Unstable desire-sets
Among other things, patients suòering from borderline personality dis-
order (BPD) are characterized by unstable “selves,” which has prompted
ethicists to consider the ethics of caring for BPD patients in terms of
authenticity (Lester 2009). A BPD patient could, for instance, display
sudden and dramatic shis in goals, values, vocational aspirations, types
of friends, and so on (ibid, p. 284). In extreme situations, BPD patients
can make a series ofmutually incompatible healthcare decisions resting
on unstable desires. For instance, a BPD patient may request forced
medication, as only that enables her to go through psychotherapy, and
minutes later refusemedication, as one of its side eòects is that it clouds
her thinking. Healthcare personnel cannot adhere to both wishes.
he main authenticity-related problem in this case appears to be
that BPD patients have too unstable desire-sets. Surely, a normal person
could have authentic but conicting wishes in subjects ofminor impor-
tance, such as an authentic wish to eat ice cream and an authentic wish
to not eat sugar. Also, normal persons could reasonably be authentically
indecisive, at least to some extent. But BPD patients appear to be un-
stable in a way that calls for judgments of inauthenticity. hat is, there
is a seriousness to their symptoms that makes it reasonable to assess
their personality, or their decisions, in terms of authenticity. However, it
remains for theorists to explain precisely why and how their instability
is an authenticity-related problem, if at all.
he theory in Ahlin Marceta (2018) does not appear to be capable of
treating themainmoral problem in this case. he theory could be applied
toparticulardecisionsmade byBPDpatients, although theproblemisnot
the decisions per se but that they rest on unstable desire-sets. herefore,
provided that this instability is an authenticity-related problem, some
other theory than Ahlin Marceta (2018) must be developed to treat it.
Case 4: Lack of desires
he late stages of schizophreniamay include “negative” symptoms such
as underactivity, blunting of aòect, passivity, and lack of initiative (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association 2013). Schizophrenics in this stage can
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sometimes lead reasonably normal lives, while being completely indif-
ferent to anything that happens to them and how their lives go. It does
not matter to them whether they are healthy, live in a comfortable home,
or havemeaningful relationships with others. hey can be described as
living without any wishes.2
he question can be raised whether this condition is authentic, i.e.,
whether a person can authentically lack wishes. In some cases a state of
mind which is free of wishes is desirable, such as when it is the wanted
result from deliberatemeditation. Buddhists,mindfulness practitioners,
and others, seek to not have any desires. However, it is diòerent to be in
that condition due to somemedical disorder. hus, it is a problem for
authenticity theorists to clarify whether it is possible to authentically
lack wishes, where this lack is due to some disorder, and if so also why.
Furthermore,when these questions have been resolved, a theorymust
be developed that can be applied to reliably determine whether a desire-
free condition or state ofmind is inauthentic. As the problem here is not
to determine whether any particular decision rests on inauthentic desires,
the theory from Ahlin Marceta (2018) cannot be applied for guidance.
Case 5: Medically induced authenticity
In the first chapterofhisbookListening toProzac (1993),Kramer reportsof
Tess, a patient whose personal story is extraordinary. Among many other
things, Tesswas a victim of child abuse. She suffered from depression and
had suicidal thoughts (p. 3). After various failed attempts at medication
and therapy Kramer prescribed Prozac, which at the time had recently
been released by theU.S. Food and DrugAdministration. Soon thereafter,
Tess showed a remarkable change. Her work becamemore satisfying, her
social relationships changed to the better, and she was “astonished at the
sensation of being free from depression” (p. 7). After ninemonths, Tess
went offmedication and continued doing well. About eight months after
that, she told Kramer that she was slipping. She said, “I’m not myself”
(p. 10). hus, Prozacmade Tess authentic (per self-report).
2I adopt this characterization from dialogues with psychiatrists.
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he case draws out a conict of intuitions. On the one hand, it is
intuitive to hold that Tess’s self-reports of authenticity are real simply
because they are self-reported. On the other, it is counterintuitive to
hold that she is authentic, as it is known that her condition is induced
bymedication. Ahlin Marceta (2018) is not helpful here, as the theory is
not intended to answer to the questions presently being asked. here
is thus reason for authenticity theorists to organize and explain these
conicting intuitions in new theoretical work.
One possible explanation of the case is that Prozac helped Tess
to “ûnd” the authentic self that she was before she was abused as a
child (provided that the abuse caused the inauthenticity). However, this
explanation is more complex than what ûrst appears.
In one sense, Tess pre-abuse is not the same person as Tess post-
abuse, because the former is a child and the latter is an adult. If Prozac
helpedTess to “find” the authentic self that shewas before shewas abused,
its effect is very specific; Prozac did not affect features of Tess’s person-
hood that are connected to her being an adult, but only features that
are connected to some core of authenticity in her as a person. hus, the
explanation assumes that Prozac, in this case, had an extremely accurate
medical effect. Furthermore, the explanation rests on the assumption
that authenticity concerns something that does not change over time,
namely some personhood-related entity which remains the same in both
Tess pre-abuse and in Tess post-abuse. hereby, it commits to theories
of personhood, philosophy ofmind, and possibly also phenomenology,
according to which a person is something intertemporally fixed. hese
theories are not obviously true. hus, the explanation is simple and at-
tractive at first glance, but upon closer examination it becomes clear that
it carries a large theoretical load which makes it very complex.
One other possible explanation is that Tess confuses who she is with
who she wants to be. She wants to be the person that Prozac helps her
to be, and therefore she states that this person is who she really is. his
explanation is also more complex than what ûrst appears. If it is correct,
normally informed and competent persons can bemistaken about who
they really are, in terms of authenticity. he explanation may disqualify
123
authenticity in bioethics
theories of authenticity that are oriented around self-assessment, and
which have otherwise been prominent in authenticity theorizing since
Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin (1988).
In conclusion, intuitively reasonable explanations of the case with
Tess are theory-dependent and complex upon closer examination. It
remains for authenticity theorists to treat cases ofmedically induced
authenticity in greater detail.
Case 6: Inauthentic recovery
Some disorders can be treatedwith eithermedicine or psychotherapy (or
both). It can be argued that, for reasons of authenticity, psychotherapy
is a better option than medicine. his line of thought has been explored
by, e.g., Kass (2003, pp. 22–3):
Inmost of our ordinary efforts at self-improvement, either by prac-
tice or training or study, we sense the relation between our doings
and the resulting improvement, between themeans used and the
end sought. here is an experiential and intelligible connection
between means and ends; we can see how confronting fearful
things might eventually enable us to cope with our fears. We
can see how curbing our appetites produces self-command. [. . . ]
In contrast, biomedical interventions act directly on the human
body andmind to bring about their effects on a subject who is
not merely passive but who plays no role at all. [. . . ] he relations
between the knowing subject and his activities, and between his
activities and their fulfillments and pleasures, are disrupted.
It is one argument that psychotherapy is better than medicine because
of some positive secondary eòects, such as a strengthened self-esteem
or longer lasting medical result. I am not concerned with that here. But,
it can also be argued that psychotherapy is better than medicine because
of some authenticity-related reason. hat is, the opinion is feasible that
authentic recovery from disorder is better than inauthentic recovery.
But, the opinion rests on the idea that there is such a thing as inauthentic
124
the nine cases article
recovery, and it is not immediately clear that there is theoretical support
for this idea beyondmere intuition.
his is diòerent from questions of whether someone’s decision be-
tween treatment and therapy is authentic. he problem for theorists, if
it is a problem at all, is to make a clear and unambiguous distinction be-
tween authentic and inauthentic recovery processes.3 Obviously, Ahlin
Marceta (2018) is not useful here.
Case 7: Indoctrinated desires
Consider this thought example (Taylor 2005, p. 11):
[Imagine] a child at time t whosemother wished him to learn
to play the piano and who beat him if he did not practice. As
time passes and the child grows more proûcient at playing, he
discovers (at time t1) that his mother’s belief that piano playing
suited himwas right, and he comes to love playing – even though
he still repudiates themeans by which his mother brought him
to this position.
he thought example is intended to bring out a conict of intuitions;
intuitively, theman’s love for playing the piano is formed in the wrong
way and is therefore inauthentic, but the man endorses his own love
for playing the piano upon informed and critical self-reection and
therefore it is intuitive to hold that it is authentic.
Diòerent authenticity theories explain such cases ofmanipulation
or indoctrination diòerently. heories that emphasize the causal history
of desires, such as, e.g., Elster’s (1983), would determine that the child’s
love for playing the piano is inauthentic. heories that focus on self-
aõrmation, such as, e.g., Frankfurt’s (1971) and Dworkin’s (1988), would
instead determine that the child’s love for playing the piano is authentic.
Onemore straightforward example of indoctrination is discussed
by Robert Noggle (2005, p. 102):
3See also Svenaeus (2009), who has previously argued that there is no ethically relevant
diòerence between psychopharmacological and psychological self-change.
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Edgar the Evil is a son of a crime boss who rears him to follow
in his footsteps. Using standard child-rearing techniques, he
encourages Edgar’s more selûsh and violent impulses and dis-
courages empathy and compassion. As Edgar reaches adulthood,
he is quite thoroughly evil.
he commonly shared intuition is that Edgar is not authentically evil.
Edgar the Evil is analogous to people who, for instance, grow up in reli-
gious sects or live under oppressive patriarchic circumstances. Some-
times such people make dubious healthcare decisions that indicate
inauthenticity. For instance, many bioethicists today agree that the
wishes of a Jehovah’s Witness who refuses blood transfusion should be
respected for anti-paternalist reasons. Further analysis may be feasi-
ble concerning their possible inauthenticity; perhaps there are similar
cases in which reliable indicators of inauthenticity provide sufficient
grounds for paternalist interventions.
It remains for authenticity theorists to organize and explain the var-
ious conflicting intuitions in cases of manipulation or indoctrination,
and to provide clear and unambiguous action-guidance with regard to
them. he theory in Ahlin Marceta (2018) is partially guiding here, but
it does not answer the relevant questions. Presumably, neither manipula-
tion nor indoctrination aremedical conditions. herefore,manipulated
or indoctrinated patients are not the kind of persons that, according to
AhlinMarceta (2018), are justifiably targeted by inauthenticity judgments.
However, this normative guidance is not satisfying. It side-steps the rele-
vant moral problem, namely the possible inauthenticity of decisions that
are due to manipulation and indoctrination, rather than solves it.
Case 8: False selves
Winnicott (2007) introduced a thought example called the “False Self”
which has been used as a paradigm model of inauthentic behavior (see,
e.g.,Velleman 2002, pp. 97–8). In the example, we are to picture a person
who “laughs at what he thinks he is supposed to find amusing, shows
concern for what he thinks he is supposed to care about, and in general
conforms himself to the demands and expectations of others” (Velleman
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2002, p. 97). He fails to be motivated “from within his true self” and
is therefore inauthentic (ibid). he lesson we are supposed to learn is
that conformity, in some sense, negates authenticity. However, it is not
obvious that the example is successful in showing that. Taylor comments
on the False Self person that, “while his laughter might not be authentic
in the sense of its expressing genuine amusement, it would be authentic
in the sense of being representative of this person’s other-directedness. It
would be authentically inauthentic” (Taylor 2009, p. 32). In other words,
the False Self person might be an authentically other-directed person.
Taylor does have a point, although there is something distressing
about his remark. he False Self example draws attention to the intuition
that there is something inauthentic about people who conform to what
they believe to be others’ wishes rather than to formulate and follow
their own. But the example is too strong. Humans are socially embedded
beings; everyone conforms to others’ expectations to some extent, at
least during periods of our lives. In many cases, we tend to think that
people who fail to conform to others’ expectations lack social skills. We
even hope that our children learn the social balance between following
one’s own desires and conforming to others’. hus, it is diõcult to draw
the straight and unambiguous line between “self-motivation” and “else-
motivation” that the False Self is intended to illuminate. However, the
thought of a personwho is “authentically inauthentic,” as Taylor suggests,
is as distressing as being completely insensitive to the expectations of
others. In reality, the normal case is likely that authentic people are
somewhere in between fully self-motivated and fully else-motivated.
here is disagreement among authenticity theorists regarding prob-
lems that are connected to the tension between social influences and
the self. It is possible that themain merit of the False Self example and
Taylor’s comments is that they illuminate one problem associated with
constructing a hypothetical ideal of authenticity; perhaps any ideal model
of authenticity would be torn apart by the forces in the dialectics above.
No person can be either authentically fully self-motivated nor authenti-
cally fully else-motivated, and therefore any ideal that is oriented around
either extreme is inherently flawed. Instead, it may be argued, a theory
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of authenticity should be non-ideally constructed, and account for the
tension between social influences and the self already from the outset.
he theory in Ahlin Marceta (2018) is non-ideal in this sense. How-
ever, as in the above, the problem presently described is not of the kind
that Ahlin Marceta (2018) is intended to solve.
Case 9: Unexplained surprising desires
Consider the hypothetical case of Anna, “a young and promising pro-
fessional ballet dancer” (Ahlin 2018, p. 44). Anna loves her work, has
moved across the nation to attend the best ballet schools, set aside per-
sonal relationships that conictedwith her career, and is known by those
who are close to her to love dancing more than anything else. In the
case, Anna has suòered a serious leg injury andmust undergo aminor
surgery to avoid implications thatwill in time necessitate an amputation.
Anna is competent to make healthcare decisions and is fully informed
about the consequences of her decisions, yet she refuses to undergo
surgery. Her treating clinician reects upon the case and believes that
Anna’s decision rests on inauthentic desires.
he case is intended to illustrate that it is oen surprises that bring
attention to the notion of authenticity; as long as peoplemake decisions
that are not unexpected, we do not consider them in terms of authentic-
ity. But, with support from Ahlin Marceta (2018), the case also shows
that decisions are not inauthenticmerely because they are surprising,
not even if the decisions are surprising to the extent that they conict
with everything that is known about the decision-maker. Judgments of
inauthenticity require a real and elaborate explanation. In the case of
Anna, the causal history of her desires are unknown and therefore the
requirement to meet the factor of alien causes is not fulûlled. hus, the
theory in Ahlin Marceta (2018) provides guidance here.
Lessons to be learned
Authenticity issues relate to a number of diòerent problems. In some of
the cases above, themain problem of authenticity is related to decision-
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making. In others, the problem rather concerns personhood or being
in some condition. herefore, there is likely no universal solution to
authenticity-related problems, but various particular solutions.
As mentioned briey in the discussion of case 8, it is possible that
bioethicists should further consider a non-ideal methodological ap-
proach to authenticity-related problems. Most (or all) theories of au-
thenticity are comprised of some hypothetical ideal of authenticity, in
the sense that they are constructed of propositions such as “X authentic
if and only if Y.” hen, the theories suggest that practitioners should
scrutinize X’s (i.e., desires, lives, persons, etc.) and observe whether
and to what extent they have or are Y. It may instead be fruitful to
follow Ahlin Marceta (2018) and adopt a non-ideal approach. Such
approaches, which are sometimes also described as “realist,” “problem-
oriented,” or “bottom-up,” may start from the case at hand rather than
from some hypothetical model of authenticity and attempt to describe
what is problematic about it in particular terms. Bioethicists should
at least explore the possibility of taking a newmethodological grip on
authenticity-related problems.
Furthermore, it may be the case that the solution to any particular
authenticity-related problem must be goal-oriented, in the sense that it
matters to the solution why it is interesting to solve the problem. hat is,
in most (or all) cases above, themain concern is related to paternalism.
herefore, the paternalist intention makes a difference to how the prob-
lems should be solved. In case 9, for instance, it is interesting to explain
the possible inauthenticity of Anna because of a concern for her practi-
cal identity and way of life as a professional ballet dancer. Perhaps this
concern, rather than some pre-established theory of authenticity, should
be guiding in an analysis of the case. However, because the paternalist
concern would then be action-guiding, it is essential that the paternalist
intention iswell-grounded first; the cartmay only be put before the horse
if this order is amoral and analytic necessity.
To summarize, this article collects nine authenticity-related cases in
biomedicine. It has been argued that there is likely no universal solution
to authenticity-related problems, but various particular solutions. he
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theory in Ahlin Marceta (2018) provides normative guidance in cases 1,
2, and 9. Lastly, it has been proposed that bioethicists should explore
alternativemethodological approaches to the notion of authenticity and
its applications in biomedicine. hemain lessons to be learned are that
there is yet a lot of analytical work to be done regarding authenticity
in biomedical contexts, and that bioethicists have reason to engage in
authenticity theory precisely as they have previously engaged in theoriza-
tions of concepts such as decision-making capacity and voluntariness.
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Popularized Summary in English
he purpose of this thesis is to make theoretical ideals of authenticity
useful in practice. By “authenticity,” I mean that someone or something
is “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar. he thesis includes an
introduction and four articles related to authenticity in amedical context.
he problems Iwrite about concern authenticity in decision-making,
or more specifically the authenticity of desires. As other philosophers,
in this context I think of “desires” as themost basic element in ordinary
decision-making; a foundational attitude or directedness that influ-
ences a person’s decisions. One paradigm example that is sometimes
used in the philosophical literature to illustrate authenticity-related
problems is a person who suffers from anorexia nervosa, and who
makes healthcare decisions that are harmful in some sense. he case
may be, for instance, an anorectic who states that she would rather die
than gain weight, and therefore declines medical treatment that would
otherwise have been good for her.
In such cases, it is important to consider whether the person is com-
petent to make healthcare decisions. Here, being “competent” means
that one can understand information about one’s own situation, reason
about the implications of the available care options, and so on. Some-
times anorectics are competent in this sense when they express wishes
that are harmful. herefore, psychiatrists, philosophers, and others,
have analyzed such healthcare decisions in terms of authenticity. he
question they raise is whether the person expresses authentic desires, in
the sense that they correspond the person’s “real” or “genuine” wishes.
An answer to the question whether a patient expresses authentic
desires requires a theory about what it means for something to be au-
thentic. In the ûrst article in this thesis, I collect various theories that
are intended to distinguish between authenticity and inauthenticity in a
taxonomy that organizes the theories aer category and class. Against
this systematization, I argue that no category or class of authenticity
theories gives rise to easily observable consequences. In short, I show
that it is diõcult—in the title of the article I claim too strongly that it is
“impossible”—to determinewhether someone else’s desires are authentic.
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his is the problem that I treat in the second article, which is also
themost theoretical article in this thesis. In it, I build from a theory that
explains authenticity in terms of aõrmative self-reection. According to
this theory, a person’s desire is authentic if she would approve of having
the desire upon informed and critical self-reection. One example that
illustrates the theory is a heroinist who has the immediate desire to
shoot heroin and also the reected desire to lead a long and healthy life.
he immediate desire is inauthentic, according to the theory, as it is not
supported by the reected desires.
he theory isdifficult to put into practice, not least because it isdifficult
to collect all the reasonswhy a person has a certain desire and then put the
person in a state ofmind where she critically reflects upon those reasons
and observe whether she, in this state of mind, approves of having the
desire. It is an impractical theory. However, in the third article, I show that
it nonetheless may give rise to practically observable consequences.
In the article, I reverse the central tenet of the theory. I argue that it is
justiûed to judge that a person’s desire is inauthentic if there is suõcient
reason to believe that the person would disapprove of having the desire
upon informed and critical self-reection. With this formulation of the
theory, it appears to bemore practical. It is possible to identify factors
indicating that a person would disapprove of her own desires. If enough
such indicators are identiûed with suõcient reliability it is justiûed to
make the judgment that her desires are inauthentic.
I suggest two such indicators in the article. he ûrst indicator con-
cerns the origin of the desire and whether it is normal to the person.
If the desire is due to a medical disorder, for instance, that indicates
that she would disapprove of having the desire if she came to know
why she had it and reected critically upon those causes. he second
indicator concerns the coherence of the desire. If it does not ût with
the desire-holder’s practical identity, i.e., how she normally thinks and
functions, that is a reason to believe that shewould disapprove of having
it upon informed and critical self-reection.
My argument is not formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions; I do not claim that judgments of inauthenticity are justified “if
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and only if x and y.” Instead, the arguments in my thesis should be under-
stood against what philosophers usually call reflective equilibrium, which
among other things means that the practical application of my theory
requires contextual interpretations and substantial moral reasoning.
Furthermore, it should be noted that a judgment of inauthenticity
does not suõce to justify paternalist interventions. hat is, even if we
are certain that a person’s desires are inauthentic, that is not enough for
it to be justiûed to, for instance, subject the person to compulsory care
against her will. Paternalism must be independently justiûed, not least
concerning the degree of conûdence in judgments of inauthenticity and
the reasonable proportion of the intervention.
In the third article of the thesis, I incorporate the theory which
is spelled out in the second article into an already existing theory of
personal autonomy, namely Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s
(Principles of Biomedical Ethics 2013). I suggest that a patient’s autonomy,
i.e., her self-governance, can be analyzed in terms of authenticity and
propose how this should be done. To demonstratemy further developed
theory of autonomy, I construct a hypothetical case of anorexia nervosa. I
use the authenticity-based concept of autonomy to analyze the anorectic’s
healthcare decisions and conclude that the analysis is fruitful and reliable.
herefore, I hold that the aim of the thesis has been met, although it is of
course the critical reader who shouldmake that judgment.
In the fourth article in this thesis I collect nine cases of authenticity-
related problems inmedical contexts. I apply the theory spelled out in the
third article to the cases where this is possible. his shows that there are
different kinds of authenticity problems; some concern the authenticity
of decision-making, others concern possibly inauthenticmental states,
and so on. herefore, I argue that there is likely not one universal solution
to authenticity-related problems in medical contexts, but rather various
particular solutions to particular problems. he discussion shows that
there is more theoretical work to be done in this field.
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Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning på svenska
Syet med den här avhandlingen är att göra teoretiska ideal om au-
tenticitet användbara i praktiken. Med autenticitet menas här att vara
»genuin», »sann mot sig själv» eller liknande. Avhandlingen innehål-
ler en »kappa» och fyra artiklar som är relaterade till autenticitet i en
medicinsk kontext.
Problemen jag skriver om gäller autenticitet i beslutsfattandet, eller
mer speciûkt autentiska begär. Med »begär» menar jag och andra ûloso-
fer i det här sammanhanget det mest grundläggande elementet i van-
ligt beslutsfattande, en basal viljeriktning som påverkar en människas
beslutsprocesser. Ett paradigmexempel som oa används i den fackûlo-
soûska litteraturen för att illustrera autenticitetsrelaterade problem är
personer som lider av anorexia nervosa och som fattar vårdbeslut som
är skadliga i någon bemärkelse.Det kan till exempel gälla en anorektiker
som säger att hon hellre dör än går upp i vikt, och som därför avstår
från vårdinsatser som annars vore bra för henne.
När sådana fall uppstår är det viktigt att undersöka huruvida perso-
nen är beslutskompetent. Med »beslutskompetens» menas att man kan
förstå information om ens egen situation, att man kan resonera kring
innebörden av olika vårdalternativ, och så vidare. Ibland är anorektiker
beslutskompetenta när de ger uttryck för viljor som är skadliga. Därför
har psykiater, ûlosofer och andra analyserat sådana vårdbeslut i termer
av autenticitet. Frågan de ställer sig är om personen ger uttryck för au-
tentiska begär, i bemärkelsen att de stämmer överens med personens
»riktiga» eller »genuina» önskemål.
För att besvara frågan om en patient ger uttryck för autentiska begär
behövs en teori om vad det innebär för ett beslut att vara autentiskt.
I avhandlingens första artikel samlar jag olika teorier som är avsed-
da att skilja mellan autenticitet och inautenticitet i en taxonomi som
organiserar teorierna eer typ och klass. Mot denna systematisering
argumenterar jag för att ingen typ eller klass av autenticitetsteorier ger
upphov till enkelt observerbara konsekvenser. Kort sagt visar jag att det
är svårt – i titeln hävdar jag för starkt att det är »omöjligt» – att avgöra
huruvida någon annans begär är autentiska.
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Det är detta problem jag tar mig an i den andra artikeln, som också
är avhandlingens mest teoretiska. Jag utgår i den från en teori som
förklarar autenticitet i termer av självreektivt bifall. Enligt teorin är
en människas begär autentiskt om hon skulle ge sitt stöd till begäret
vid informerad och kritisk självreektion. Ett exempel som illustrerar
teorin är en heroinist som har det omedelbara begäret att skjuta heroin
och samtidigt ett reekterat begär eer ett långt och hälsosamt liv. Det
omedelbara begäret är inautentiskt, enligt teorin, eersom det inte har
stöd av de reekterade begären.
Teorin är svår att omsätta i praktiken, inteminst eftersom det är svårt
att samla alla skäl till varför en person har ett visst begär och sedan försätta
personen i ett sinnestillstånd så att hon reflekterar kritiskt över dessa skäl
och sedan observera huruvida hon i detta tillstånd ger sitt stöd till begäret
eller inte.Det är en opraktisk teori. Men i den tredje artikeln visar jag hur
den trots allt kan ge upphov till praktiskt observerbara konsekvenser.
Det första jag gör i artikeln är att vända på teorin. Jag argumenterar
för att det är rättfärdigat att bedöma att en persons begär är inautentiskt
om det ûnns tillräckliga skäl att tro att personen skullemisstycka till
att ha begäret vid en informerad och kritisk självreektion. Med denna
formulering av teorin tycks den bli mer praktisk – det är nämligen
möjligt att identiûera sakliga faktorer som indikerar att någon skulle
misstycka till sina egna begär. Om vi med tillräckligt hög tillförlitlighet
identiûerar tillräckligt starka sådana indikatorer är vi berättigade att
fälla omdömet att personens begär är inautentiska.
Jag föreslår två sådana indikatorer i artikeln. Den första indikatorn
är om begäret har uppstått till följd av orsaker som är onormala för perso-
nen, som till exempel en sjukdom. Den andra indikatorn är om begäret
inte stämmer överens med personens praktiska identitet, alltså hur hon
vanligtvis tänker och fungerar. Tillsammans ger de två indikatorerna
skäl att tro att en persons begär är inautentiskt.
Min argumentation är inte uttryckt i termer av nödvändiga och
tillräckliga villkor, jag hävdar inte att inautenticitetsomdömen är rättfär-
digade »omoch endast om x och y». I stället ska argumentationen förstås
mot bakgrund av vad ûlosofer brukar kalla för reektivt ekvilibrium,
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vilket bland annat innebär att den praktiska applikationen avmin teori
kräver kontextuella tolkningar och substantiellt moraliskt resonerande.
Det är i sammanhanget relevant att ett omdöme om inautenticitet inte är
tillräckligt för att rättfärdiga paternalistiska interventioner.Det vill säga,
även om vi är säkra på att en persons begär är inautentiska så räcker
inte detta för att vi ska ha rätt att till exempel tvångsvårda personen mot
hennes vilja. För att paternalism ska vara rättfärdigat krävs ytterligare
stöd, inteminst vad gäller graden av säkerhet i inautenticitetsomdömet
och den rimliga proportionaliteten i interventionen.
I avhandlingens tredje artikel inkorporerar jag teorin som stavas ut
i den andra artikeln i en redan beûntlig teori om personlig autonomi,
nämligen den som Tom L. Beauchamp och James F. Childress har for-
mulerat (Principles of Biomedical Ethics 2013). Jag föreslår att en patients
autonomi, alltså hennes självbestämmande, kan analyseras i termer av
autenticitet och föreslår hur detta ska genomföras. För att demonstrera
mitt utvecklade autonomibegrepp konstruerar jag ett hypotetiskt fall av
anorexia nervosa. Jag använder det autenticitetsbaserade autonomibe-
greppet för att analysera den hypotetiska anorektikerns vårdbeslut och
drar slutsatsen att analysen är tillförlitlig.
I avhandlingens ärde artikel samlar jag nio fall med autenticitetsre-
laterade problem i medicinska sammanhang. Jag applicerar teorin som
stavas ut i den tredje artikeln på de fall då detta är möjligt. Jag argumen-
terar för att det ûnns olika typer av autenticietsrelaterade problem:Vissa
gäller autenticitet i beslutsfattandet, andra gäller möjligt inautentiska
sinnestillstånd, och så vidare. Därför argumenterar jag också för att det
troligtvis inte ûnns en enda universallösning på autenticitetsrelaterade
problem i medicinska sammanhang, utan att det krävs era olika lös-
ningar för olika typer av problem. Diskussionen visar att det ûnns mer
teoretiskt forskningsarbete att utföra i den här kontexten.
Delar av den svenska sammanfattningen är tidigare publicerad som Ahlin Marceta, J.
(2018, 5 juli). Nytt forskningspapper om vad som rättfärdigar inautenticitetsomdö-
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